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______________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.    
This opinion addresses two sets of consolidated 
appeals concerning two pharmaceutical drugs: Lipitor and 
Effexor XR.  In both sets of consolidated appeals, 
plaintiffs allege that the companies holding the patents 
related to Lipitor and Effexor XR fraudulently procured 
and enforced certain of those patents.  Plaintiffs further 
allege that those companies holding the patents entered 
into unlawful, monopolistic settlement agreements with 
potential manufacturers of generic versions of Lipitor and 
Effexor XR.  The same District Court Judge dismissed the 
complaints in the Lipitor litigation and dismissed certain 
allegations in the Effexor litigation.  Those decisions 
relied on plausibility determinations that are now 
challenged on appeal. 
We begin with a brief summary of the relevant 
regulatory scheme applicable to pharmaceutical drugs and 
then detail the factual and procedural backgrounds of these 
two sets of consolidated appeals.  The remainder of the 
opinion broadly covers two issues.  First, in F.T.C. v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Supreme Court 
concluded that payments from patentees to infringers 
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through “reverse payment settlement agreements” are 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.  Id. at 2227.  In both sets of 
consolidated appeals, plaintiffs allege that the companies 
holding the pharmaceutical patents and the generic 
manufacturers entered into such agreements.  We are 
asked to decide whether those allegations are plausible.  
We conclude, as to both sets of appeals, that they are.  
Second, regarding only the Lipitor consolidated appeals, 
we address whether plaintiffs in those appeals pled 
plausible allegations of fraudulent patent procurement and 
enforcement, as well as other related misconduct.  We 
again determine that those allegations are indeed 
plausible.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of the complaints in the Lipitor 
litigation, reverse its dismissal of the allegations in the 
Effexor litigation, and remand for further proceedings.   
I 
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), 98 Stat. 
1585, as amended, provides a regulatory framework 
designed in part to (1) ensure that only rigorously tested 
pharmaceutical drugs are marketed to the consuming 
public, (2) incentivize drug manufacturers to invest in new 
research and development, and (3) encourage generic drug 
entry into the marketplace.  As we have noted previously, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act contains four key relevant 
features.  See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 
135 (3d Cir. 2017) (Lipitor III), as amended (Apr. 19, 
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2017); King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham 
Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 446 (2016). 
First, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires a drug 
manufacturer wishing to market a new brand-name drug 
to first submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355, and then undergo a long, complex, and costly 
testing process, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (requiring, 
among other things, “full reports of investigations” into 
safety and effectiveness; “a full list of the articles used as 
components”; and a “full description” of how the drug is 
manufactured, processed, and packed).  If this process is 
successful, the FDA may grant the drug manufacturer 
approval to market the brand-name drug. 
Second, after that approval, a generic manufacturer 
can obtain similar approval by submitting an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that “shows that the 
generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and is 
biologically equivalent to, the brand-name drug.”  Caraco 
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405 
(2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)).  This 
way, a generic manufacturer does not need to undergo the 
same costly approval procedures to develop a drug that has 
already received FDA approval.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2228 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing the 
generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, 
‘speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to 
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market,’ Caraco, [566 U.S. at 405], thereby furthering 
drug competition.” (first alteration in original)).   
Third, foreseeing the potential for conflict between 
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers, the Hatch-
Waxman Act “sets forth special procedures for 
identifying, and resolving, related patent disputes.”  Id.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act, as well as federal regulations, 
requires brand-name drug manufacturers to file 
information about their patents with their NDA.  Id.  The 
brand-name manufacturer “is required to list any patents 
issued relating to the drug’s composition or methods of 
use.”  Lipitor III, 855 F.3d at 135.  That filing must include 
the patent number and expiration date of the patent.  See 
Caraco, 566 U.S. at 405 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)).  
Upon approval of the brand-name manufacturer’s NDA, 
the FDA publishes the submitted patent information in its 
“Orange Book,” more formally known as the Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.  
Id. at 405–06.   
Once a patent has been listed in the Orange Book, 
the generic manufacturer is free to file an ANDA if it can 
certify that its proposed generic drug will not actually 
violate the brand manufacturer’s patents.  Id. at 405; see 
also id. (The FDA “cannot authorize a generic drug that 
would infringe a patent.”).  A generic manufacturer’s 
ANDA certification may state: 
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(I) that such patent information has not been 
filed, 
(II) that such patent has expired, 
(III) . . . the date on which such patent will 
expire, or  
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of 
the new drug for which the application is 
submitted. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  “The ‘paragraph IV’ 
route[], automatically counts as patent infringement . . . .”  
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A)).  As a result, a paragraph IV certification 
often “means provoking litigation” instituted by the brand 
manufacturer.  Caraco, 566 U.S. at 407.   
If the brand-name manufacturer initiates a patent 
infringement suit within 45 days of the ANDA filing, the 
FDA must withhold approval of the generic for at least 30 
months while the parties litigate the validity or 
infringement of the patent.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).  If a court decides 
the infringement claim within this 30-month period, then 
the FDA will follow that determination.  Id.  However, if 
the litigation is still proceeding at the end of the 30-month 
period, the FDA may give its approval to the generic drug 
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manufacturer to begin marketing a generic version of the 
drug.  Id.  The generic manufacturer then has the option to 
launch “at risk,” meaning that, if the ongoing court 
proceeding ultimately determines that the patent was valid 
and infringed, the generic manufacturer will be liable for 
the brand-name manufacturer’s lost profits despite the 
FDA’s approval.  See King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 396 n.8. 
Fourth, to incentivize generic drug manufacturers to 
file an ANDA challenging weak patents, the Hatch-
Waxman Act provides that the first generic manufacturer 
to file a paragraph IV certification will enjoy a 180-day 
exclusivity period.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  This 
exclusivity period prevents any other generic from 
competing with the brand-name drug, see Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2229, which is an opportunity that can be “worth 
several hundred million dollars,” to the first-ANDA filer, 
id. (quoting C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006)).  This 
180-day exclusivity period belongs only to the first 
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA; if the first-ANDA 
filer forfeits its exclusivity rights, no other generic 
manufacturer is entitled to it.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D)).  Importantly, the brand-name 
manufacturer is not barred from entering the generic 
market with its own generic version of the drug—a so-
called “authorized generic”—during the 180-day 
exclusivity period.  See Lipitor III, 855 F.3d at 135–36 
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(citing cases).  
II 
These consolidated appeals concerning Lipitor and 
Effexor XR involve antitrust challenges related to that 
pharmaceutical regulatory scheme.  This panel previously 
detailed much of the factual background and procedural 
history of these appeals.  See Lipitor III, 855 F.3d at 136–
42.  In relevant part, we repeat and expand on much of that 
earlier recitation. 
A 
In In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 14-1402 et 
al., plaintiffs are a putative class of direct purchasers of 
branded Lipitor, a putative class of end payors, and several 
individual retailers asserting direct-purchaser claims.1  We 
will refer to these plaintiffs collectively as the “Lipitor 
plaintiffs.”  Defendants are Pfizer Inc., Ranbaxy Inc., and 
their respective corporate affiliates; they will be referred 
to collectively as the “Lipitor defendants.”  We proceed by 
                                                   
1 Earlier this year, the action of a fourth group of 
plaintiffs—California-based pharmacists raising claims 
under California law—was remanded to the District Court 
for a federal subject-matter jurisdiction determination.  
See Lipitor III, 855 F.3d at 151–52.  We retained 
jurisdiction over their appeal.  Id. 
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outlining the factual background behind those 
consolidated appeals and then describing their procedural 
history. 
1 
Lipitor is a brand-name drug designed to reduce the 
level of LDL cholesterol in the bloodstream.  In 1987, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted Pfizer 
the original patent for Lipitor.2  That patent—designated 
U.S. Patent No. 4,681,893 (the ‘893 Patent)—claimed 
protection for atorvastatin, Lipitor’s active ingredient.  
Although initially set to expire on May 30, 2006, the ‘893 
patent received an extension from the FDA, lengthening 
the patent’s term through March 24, 2010.   
Pfizer obtained additional, follow-on patent 
protection for Lipitor in December 1993 when the PTO 
issued U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (the ‘995 Patent).  That 
patent claimed protection for atorvastatin calcium, the 
specific salt form of the active atorvastatin molecule in 
Lipitor.  Lipitor plaintiffs assert that Pfizer committed 
fraud in the procurement and enforcement of the ‘995 
Patent.  They allege that Pfizer submitted false and 
misleading data to the PTO to support its claim that the 
cholesterol-synthesis inhibiting activity of atorvastatin 
calcium was surprising and unexpected.  Specifically, 
                                                   
2 Pfizer merged with Warner-Lambert Co. in 2002.  We 
refer to the two entities collectively as “Pfizer.” 
 26 
 
Lipitor plaintiffs claim that Pfizer chemists informed 
senior management that the ‘893 Patent already covered 
atorvastatin calcium; Pfizer produced a misleading chart 
and other data, purportedly cherry-picked, to support its 
claim that atorvastatin calcium was several times more 
effective than expected; and, in order to avoid 
undermining its claim of surprising results, Pfizer 
intentionally withheld another dataset that contradicted its 
claim as to the surprising effectiveness of atorvastatin 
calcium.  The PTO originally denied the patent application 
for atorvastatin calcium as “anticipated” by the ‘893 
Patent.  In response, Pfizer submitted a declaration from 
one of its chemists claiming even greater, i.e., more 
surprising, results from testing atorvastatin calcium.  The 
PTO again rejected the patent application for atorvastatin 
calcium based on its contents being covered by the ‘893 
Patent.  Pfizer appealed that determination to the PTO’s 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  The PTAB 
reversed the rejection of Pfizer’s patent application, 
concluding that the application was not anticipated by the 
‘893 Patent.  It, however, required further proceedings on 
Pfizer’s application, noting that “[a]n obviousness 
rejection . . . appear[ed] to be in order.”  Lipitor JA353 
(DPP Orig. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 157–58).3  Nevertheless, as 
                                                   
3 We refer to the joint appendix in Lipitor as “Lipitor JA.”  
Also, as Lipitor plaintiffs’ complaints contain 
substantively identical factual allegations, we cite only to 
the direct purchasers’ complaints, referring to their 
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noted above, the PTO concluded that the patent 
application claimed nonobvious material and issued the 
‘995 Patent.  The ‘995 Patent expired on June 28, 2011.   
After obtaining the ‘893 and ‘995 Patents, Pfizer 
launched Lipitor in 1997.  Following Lipitor’s 1997 
launch, Pfizer obtained five additional patents, none of 
which, according to Lipitor plaintiffs, could delay further 
generic versions of the drug from coming to market.  
Pfizer listed all Lipitor patents in the FDA’s Orange Book, 
with the exception of certain “process” patents, which 
could not be listed.  Lipitor plaintiffs allege fraud only as 
to the procurement and enforcement of the ‘995 Patent. 
In August 2002, Ranbaxy obtained ANDA first-
filer status for a generic version of Lipitor.  Sometime later 
in 2002, Ranbaxy notified Pfizer of its paragraph IV 
certifications, which asserted that Ranbaxy’s sale, 
marketing, or use of generic Lipitor would not infringe any 
valid Pfizer patent.  Pfizer subsequently sued Ranbaxy for 
patent infringement in the District of Delaware within the 
45-day period prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
Pfizer alleged that Ranbaxy’s generic would infringe the 
‘893 and ‘995 Patents.  As a result of Pfizer’s lawsuit, the 
                                                   
original amended complaint as “DPP Orig. Am. Compl.” 
and the second amended complaint as “DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl.” 
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FDA withheld approval of Ranbaxy’s ANDA for 30 
months pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act.   
After a bench trial, the Delaware District Court 
ruled that Pfizer’s patents were valid and enforceable and 
would be infringed by Ranbaxy’s generic.  Pfizer Inc. v. 
Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 405 F. Supp. 2d 495, 525–26 (D. Del. 
2005).  In doing so, it rejected Ranbaxy’s argument that 
the ‘995 Patent was procured by inequitable conduct.  Id. 
at 520–25.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s ruling that the ‘893 Patent would be 
infringed.  Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 
1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  But, the Federal Circuit 
reversed in part, holding that claim 6 of the ‘995 Patent 
was invalid.  Id. at 1291–92.  On remand, the District 
Court enjoined FDA approval of Ranbaxy’s ANDA until 
March 24, 2010, the date of the ‘893 Patent’s expiration.   
In July 2005, as the 30-month statutory window 
barring Ranbaxy’s generic market entry was closing, 
Pfizer filed a citizen petition with the FDA stating that the 
amorphous noncrystalline form of atorvastatin used in 
generic Lipitor (including in Ranbaxy’s, as identified in its 
ANDA) may be “inferior in quality” to branded Lipitor’s 
crystalline form.  Lipitor JA1851.  Lipitor plaintiffs claim 
that this citizen petition was a sham.  In particular, they 
allege that Pfizer’s citizen petition ignored both a decade-
old FDA policy and FDA statements expressing the 
immateriality of drug form (i.e., crystalline versus 
amorphous), ignored Pfizer’s own use of the amorphous 
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form of branded Lipitor in its clinical studies, and lacked 
any evidence to support its claims.  In May 2006, the FDA 
informed Pfizer that it had not yet reached a decision on 
the petition, citing the need for further review and analysis 
given the “complex issues” it raised.  Lipitor JA1877.  The 
FDA eventually denied the citizen petition in a 12-page 
decision issued on November 30, 2011.   
In 2007, following the Federal Circuit’s ruling 
invalidating claim 6 of the ‘995 Patent, Pfizer applied for 
a reissuance of the ‘995 Patent to cure the relevant error.  
Ranbaxy filed an objection to the reissuance with the PTO.  
As explained below, however, Ranbaxy withdrew its 
objection, and the PTO reissued the ‘995 Patent in April 
2009, relying on Lipitor’s “commercial success,” without 
addressing whether Pfizer first obtained the patent using 
allegedly fraudulent submissions.   
During their Lipitor patent dispute, Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy also litigated a patent-infringement suit 
regarding a separate drug, Accupril.  Pfizer owned the 
patent on Accupril, enjoying annual sales of over $500 
million.  Teva Pharmaceuticals first filed an ANDA 
seeking approval to market a generic version of Accupril.  
Ranbaxy subsequently filed an ANDA for Accupril as 
well.  Pfizer sued Teva, resulting in Teva being enjoined 
from selling its generic until expiration of Pfizer’s 
Accupril patent.  Meanwhile, Ranbaxy still sought to sell 
its version of generic Accupril but could not do so because 
of the 180-day exclusivity period (not yet triggered) 
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available to Teva under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  With 
Teva enjoined from selling its generic Accupril and 
Ranbaxy prevented from selling its generic because of 
Teva’s first-filer exclusivity right, Teva and Ranbaxy 
entered into an agreement through which Teva became the 
exclusive distributor of Ranbaxy’s generic.  The parties 
agreed to split the profits from the sales, and Ranbaxy 
agreed to indemnify Teva for any liability related to the 
launch of its generic.  Ranbaxy received approval for its 
generic version of Accupril in 2004.   
Shortly after receiving that approval, Ranbaxy 
launched its generic Accupril, and Pfizer brought suit 
almost immediately, seeking treble damages for willful 
infringement.  Pfizer also sought a preliminary injunction 
against Ranbaxy and Teva, informing the court that 
Ranbaxy’s generic sales “decimated” its Accupril sales.  
The District Court in Pfizer’s Accupril action granted the 
injunction halting Ranbaxy’s generic sales, and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the grant.  Pfizer Inc. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
Pfizer posted a $200 million bond in conjunction with the 
District Court’s entry of the injunction.  After entry of the 
injunction, Pfizer expressed confidence that it would 
succeed in obtaining a substantial monetary judgment 
from Ranbaxy.  On June 13, 2007, in light of the disputed 
Accupril patent’s expiration, the District Court vacated the 
preliminary injunction.  The only issues that remained 
contested were Pfizer’s claims for past damages and 
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Ranbaxy’s counterclaim as secured by the preliminary 
injunction bond. 
In March 2008, Pfizer again sued Ranbaxy in the 
District of Delaware over Lipitor; this time, Pfizer claimed 
that Ranbaxy’s generic Lipitor would infringe Pfizer’s two 
Lipitor-related process patents.  Lipitor plaintiffs contend 
that this litigation was a sham because no imminent threat 
of harm to Pfizer existed and because Pfizer knew 
Ranbaxy’s generic would not violate those patents.  They 
assert that the actual purpose of Pfizer’s suit was to create 
“the illusion of litigation” so that the parties could enter a 
settlement agreement.  Lipitor JA254 (DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 137).   
Not long after Pfizer brought suit against Ranbaxy, 
on June 17, 2008, Pfizer and Ranbaxy executed a near-
global litigation settlement—which Lipitor plaintiffs 
allege constituted an unlawful reverse payment—
regarding scores of patent litigations around the world, 
including the Lipitor and Accupril disputes.  The 
settlement ended the Accupril litigation with prejudice, 
and brought to a close not only all domestic patent 
infringement litigation between Pfizer and Ranbaxy 
pertaining to Lipitor, but also all foreign litigation between 
the two companies over Lipitor.  By the settlement’s 
terms, Ranbaxy agreed to delay its entry in the generic 
Lipitor market until November 30, 2011.  In addition, 
Pfizer and Ranbaxy negotiated similar market entry dates 
for generic Lipitor in several foreign jurisdictions.  
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Ranbaxy also paid $1 million to Pfizer in connection with 
the Accupril litigation, and Pfizer’s $200 million 
injunction bond from the Accupril litigation was released.  
Ranbaxy further agreed to cease its protests on the ‘995 
Patent’s reissuance.  (As noted above, the PTO 
subsequently issued the ‘995 Patent in March 2009.)  
Although not alleged in their complaints, the settlement 
also created a Canadian supply arrangement for generic 
Lipitor between the parties and resolved other litigation 
regarding the pharmaceutical drug Caduet. 
Ranbaxy delayed generic entry until November 
2011, thus extending Pfizer’s exclusivity in the Lipitor 
market twenty months beyond the expiration of the ‘893 
Patent and five months beyond the expiration of what 
Ranbaxy alleged was the fraudulently procured ‘995 
Patent.  As a result, Ranbaxy’s delayed entry created a 
bottleneck in the entry of generic Lipitor from later ANDA 
filers.  Due to its ANDA first-filer status, Ranbaxy was 
entitled to the first-filer 180-day generic market 
exclusivity.  Under the settlement agreement, though, 
Ranbaxy would not trigger that period by entering the 
generic market until November 2011.  That meant that any 
other would-be generic manufacturer that wanted 
Ranbaxy’s 180-day period to begin earlier than November 
2011 needed a court to hold that all of Pfizer’s Lipitor 
patents listed in the Orange Book were invalid or not 
infringed.  Pfizer helped to forestall this possibility, 
Lipitor plaintiffs assert, through a combination of lawsuits 
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against subsequent ANDA filers.  The FDA ultimately 
approved Ranbaxy’s Lipitor ANDA on November 30, 
2011, the day Ranbaxy’s license to the unexpired Lipitor 
patents with Pfizer commenced.   
2 
Beginning in late 2011, Lipitor direct purchasers 
and end payors filed separate antitrust actions in various 
federal district courts.  The cases were subsequently 
referred to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(“JPML”) for coordination.  The JPML transferred each 
case to the District of New Jersey, assigning the matters to 
District Judge Peter G. Sheridan.  See In re Lipitor 
Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2012).   
Thereafter, the direct-purchaser and end-payor 
plaintiffs filed amended class action complaints; Lipitor 
individual-retailer plaintiffs likewise filed complaints 
joining the consolidated proceedings.  The complaints 
raise two substantively identical claims: (1) a 
monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
(15 U.S.C. § 2) or a state analogue against Pfizer, asserting 
that the company engaged in an overarching 
anticompetitive scheme that involved fraudulently 
procuring the ‘995 Patent from the PTO (Walker Process4 
fraud), falsely listing that patent in the FDA’s Orange 
                                                   
4 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
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Book, enforcing the ‘995 Patent and certain process 
patents through sham litigation, filing a sham citizen 
petition with the FDA, and entering into a reverse payment 
settlement agreement with Ranbaxy; and (2) a claim under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) or a state 
analogue against both Pfizer and Ranbaxy, challenging the 
settlement agreement as an unlawful restraint of trade.   
Lipitor defendants filed motions to dismiss all the 
complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  During the pendency of those motions, 
on May 16, 2013, the District Court stayed proceedings, 
awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis.  
Following that decision on June 17, 2013, the District 
Court reopened the case and permitted the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on the pending motions to dismiss.   
On September 5, 2013, the District Court dismissed 
Lipitor plaintiffs’ complaints to the extent they were based 
on anything other than the reverse payment settlement 
agreement.  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 
4780496, at *27 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (Lipitor I).  The 
Court specifically rejected the Walker Process fraud, false 
Orange Book listing, sham litigation, sham FDA citizen 
petition, and overall monopolistic scheme allegations 
related to Lipitor plaintiffs’ monopolization claims against 
Pfizer.  Id. at *15–23.  However, the Court granted leave 
to file amended complaints focused solely on the reverse 
payment settlement agreement between Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy.  Id. at *25–27. 
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Lipitor plaintiffs filed amended complaints in 
October 2013.  The direct purchasers and end payors 
attached their prior complaints as exhibits to their new 
complaints to preserve the allegations that had been 
dismissed for appeal.  Similarly, the independent retailers 
stated in the first paragraph of their new complaints that 
they were also preserving the previously dismissed 
allegations.  In November 2013, Lipitor defendants moved 
to dismiss the amended complaints.   
On September 12, 2014, the District Court 
dismissed the direct purchaser’s amended complaint with 
prejudice, rejecting the remaining allegations relating to 
the reverse payment settlement agreement between Pfizer 
and Ranbaxy.  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 
523 (D.N.J. 2014) (Lipitor II).  The complaints of the end 
payor and individual retailers were dismissed that same 
day in light of the District Court’s dismissal of the direct 
purchasers’ complaint.   
On October 10, 2014, the direct purchasers filed a 
motion to amend the judgment and for leave to file an 
amended complaint, contending that the District Court 
applied “a new, heightened pleading standard.”  Lipitor 
JA151.  That motion was denied on March 16, 2015.  
These timely appeals followed. 
B 
In In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 15-
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1184 et al., plaintiffs are a putative class of direct 
purchasers of branded Effexor XR, a putative class of end 
payors, two individual third-party payors, and several 
individual retailers asserting direct-purchaser claims.  We 
will refer to these parties collectively as the “Effexor 
plaintiffs.”  Defendants are Wyeth, Inc., Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., and their respective 
corporate affiliates.  We will likewise refer to these parties 
collectively as the “Effexor defendants.”  As with the 
Lipitor appeals, we proceed by outlining the factual 
background behind these consolidated appeals and then 
describing their procedural history. 
1 
Effexor is a brand-name drug used to treat 
depression.  In 1985, the PTO issued American Home 
Products, Wyeth’s predecessor, a patent for Effexor’s 
active ingredient—the compound venlafaxine 
hydrochloride.  The patent for that compound expired on 
June 13, 2008.   
In 1993, the FDA granted Wyeth approval to begin 
marketing Effexor, which Wyeth did with respect to an 
instant-release version of the drug (or “Effexor IR”).  Four 
years later, the FDA granted Wyeth approval for Effexor 
XR, an extended-release, once-daily version of the drug.  
Wyeth obtained three patents for Effexor XR, all of which 
expired on March 20, 2017.  Effexor plaintiffs contend that 
Wyeth obtained the Effexor XR patents through fraud on 
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the PTO, improperly listed those patents in the FDA’s 
Orange Book, and enforced those patents through serial 
sham litigation.5 
On December 10, 2002, Teva obtained ANDA first-
filer status for a generic version of Effexor XR.  Teva’s 
ANDA included paragraph IV certifications, asserting that 
Teva’s sale, marketing, or use of generic Effexor would 
not infringe Wyeth’s patents or that those patents were 
invalid or unenforceable.  As the first company to file an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for generic 
Effexor XR, Teva was entitled to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act’s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity.  Within the 
45-day period prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
Wyeth brought suit against Teva for patent infringement 
in the District of New Jersey.   
In October 2005, shortly after the District Court 
held a Markman6 hearing on patent claim construction, 
Wyeth and Teva reached a settlement.  Effexor plaintiffs 
allege that the District Court’s ruling at the Markman 
hearing spurred the parties to reach a settlement 
                                                   
5 As explained below, the District Court did not dismiss 
Effexor plaintiffs’ allegations related to Wyeth’s 
fraudulent procurement and enforcement of the Effexor 
patents.  Because those allegations are thus not at issue on 
appeal, we do not detail them here. 
6 Named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
517 U.S. 370 (1996).   
 38 
 
agreement, as Wyeth feared that it would lose the 
litigation.  A loss would have enabled other generic 
manufacturers to then enter the Effexor XR market.  Under 
the terms of the settlement, Wyeth and Teva agreed to 
vacate the Markman ruling.  They further agreed to a 
market entry date of July 1, 2010, for Teva’s generic 
Effexor XR, nearly seven years before the expiration of 
Wyeth’s patents.  Wyeth further agreed that it would not 
market an authorized-generic Effexor XR during Teva’s 
180-day exclusivity period (the “no-AG agreement”).  
Effexor plaintiffs allege that Wyeth’s promise to stay out 
of the generic Effexor XR market was worth more than 
$500 million, observing that Teva would gain all the sales 
of generic Effexor XR during Teva’s generic exclusivity 
period.  Wyeth also agreed to allow Teva to sell a generic 
version of Wyeth’s Effexor IR before the original patent 
for Effexor expired in June 2008, and Wyeth promised not 
to launch an authorized generic to compete with Teva’s 
instant-release generic.   
In return, and in addition to the delayed entry date 
for generic Effexor XR, Teva agreed to pay royalties to 
Wyeth.  With regard to its generic Effexor XR sales, Teva 
would pay Wyeth royalties beginning at 15% during its 
180-day exclusivity period.  If Wyeth chose not to 
introduce an authorized generic after 180 days and no 
other generic entered the market, Teva was required to pay 
Wyeth 50% royalties for the next 180 days and 65% 
royalties thereafter for up to 80 months.  As to Teva’s sales 
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of generic Effexor IR, Teva agreed to pay Wyeth 28% 
royalties during the first year and 20% during the second 
year.   
In November 2005, Wyeth and Teva filed the 
settlement agreement with the District Court presiding 
over the patent-infringement litigation.  As required by a 
2002 consent decree, Wyeth submitted the agreement to 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which possessed 
the right to weigh in on and raise objections to Wyeth’s 
settlements.  The FTC offered no objection but reserved 
its right to take later action.  The settlement was also 
submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice, and again to 
the FTC, pursuant to Section 1112 of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003 (“MMA”), Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 
2461–63 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note).  The 
District Court thereafter entered orders vacating its prior 
Markman rulings, dismissing the case, and adopting in 
summary fashion the terms of the settlement as a consent 
decree and permanent injunction.  Effexor JA1298.7 
Following the Wyeth-Teva settlement, between 
April 2006 and April 2011, Wyeth brought patent-
infringement suits against sixteen other companies that 
sought to market a generic version of Effexor XR.  Each 
                                                   
7 We refer to the joint appendix in the Effexor consolidated 
appeals as “Effexor JA.” 
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lawsuit ended in settlement and without a court order 
regarding the validity or enforceability of Wyeth’s patents.   
2 
Beginning in May 2011, several direct purchasers 
of Effexor XR filed class action complaints raising various 
antitrust claims in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi.  Those cases were consolidated 
and, on September 21, 2011, that Court transferred the 
action to District Judge Peter G. Sheridan in the U.S. 
District Court for District of New Jersey.   
After the consolidation and transfer, the direct 
purchasers filed an amended consolidated class action 
complaint, a group of end payors joined the case with a 
consolidated class action complaint, several individual 
retailers filed complaints, and two individual third-party 
payors together filed their own complaint.  As with the 
consolidated Lipitor appeals, their complaints each raise 
two substantively identical claims: (1) a monopolization 
claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) 
or a state analogue against Wyeth, asserting that Wyeth 
fraudulently induced the PTO to issue the three patents 
covering Effexor XR (Walker Process fraud), improperly 
listed those patents in the Orange Book, enforced those 
patents through serial sham litigation, and entered into a 
reverse payment settlement with Teva; and (2) a claim 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) or a 
state analogue against both Wyeth and Teva, alleging the 
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reverse payment settlement agreement between them was 
an unlawful restraint of trade.8  
In April 2012, Effexor defendants filed motions to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  During the pendency of 
those motions, the District Court stayed proceedings in 
October 2012 pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Actavis.  Following the Actavis ruling, the District Court 
vacated the stay, reopened the case, and called for 
supplemental briefing on the pending motions to dismiss.  
On October 23, 2013, the direct purchasers (but no other 
party) filed an amended complaint.  That amended 
complaint was met with a renewed motion to dismiss.   
On October 6, 2014, the District Court granted in 
part and denied in part Effexor defendants’ motions to 
dismiss.  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. CIV.A. 11-
5479 PGS, 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).  It 
granted the motions to dismiss, with prejudice, as to 
Effexor plaintiffs’ challenges to the reverse payment 
settlement agreement between Wyeth and Teva under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (or its state analogue).  Id. 
at *19–24.  The District Court denied the motions as they 
related to the remaining allegations of Effexor plaintiffs 
against Wyeth.  Id. at *24–26.  At Effexor plaintiffs’ 
request, the District Court directed entry of a final 
judgment as to the Section 1 claims (or their state 
                                                   
8 The individual third-party payors’ operative complaint 
names only Wyeth and its affiliates as defendants.   
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analogues) against Wyeth and Teva under Rule 54(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  These timely 
appeals followed.  
III 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
with respect to the Lipitor and Effexor direct purchasers 
and independent retailers under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1337(a), the Lipitor and Effexor end payors under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d), and the Effexor independent third-party 
payors under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).   
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  In April 2017, this Court concluded that 
the Lipitor and Effexor consolidated actions did not “arise 
under” patent law and consequently denied Lipitor and 
Effexor plaintiffs’ request for a transfer to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  In re Lipitor Antitrust 
Litig., 855 F.3d at 145–46; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) 
(providing district courts with original jurisdiction over 
actions “arising under” federal patent law); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a) (providing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit with “exclusive jurisdiction” over “an 
appeal from a final decision . . . in any civil action arising 
under” federal patent law).  Appellate jurisdiction, 
therefore, is proper in this Court, not the Federal Circuit. 
We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo.  See Phillips v. 
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County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  
We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and, examining for plausibility, “determine whether, 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the 
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Bronowicz v. Allegheny 
County, 804 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Powell 
v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 2014)).  As part of 
that review, we may consider documents “integral to or 
explicitly referred to in the complaint” without turning a 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.  
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
With allegations of fraud, “a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake,” although “intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also U.S. ex rel. Moore & Co., 
P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 
(3d Cir. 2016) (“A plaintiff alleging fraud must therefore 
support its allegations ‘with all of the essential factual 
background that would accompany the first paragraph of 
any newspaper story—that is, the who, what, when, where 
and how of the events at issue.’” (quoting In re Rockefeller 
Ctr. Props., Inc. Securities Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 217 (3d 
Cir. 2002))); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 695 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring that 
allegations of fraudulent procurement of a patent be pled 
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with particularity).  In doing so, “a party must plead [its] 
claim with enough particularity to place defendants on 
notice of the ‘precise misconduct with which they are 
charged.’”  United States ex rel. Petras v. Simparel, Inc., 
857 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lum v. Bank of 
Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on 
other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557 (2007)). 
IV 
In F.T.C. v. Actavis, the Supreme Court held that 
reverse payments made pursuant to settlement agreements 
(“reverse payment settlement agreements”) may give rise 
to antitrust liability.  133 S. Ct. at 2227.  Often arising from 
pharmaceutical drug litigation, reverse payment 
settlement agreements operate counter to conventional 
settlement norms.  As traditionally understood, 
settlements involve an agreement by a defendant (i.e., a 
patent infringer in the pharmaceutical drug context) to pay 
a plaintiff (i.e., the patentee) to end a lawsuit.  A reverse 
payment settlement agreement instead “requires the 
patentee to pay the alleged infringer,” in return for the 
infringer’s agreement not to produce the patented item.  Id.  
To make that abstract explanation more concrete, the 
Supreme Court gave the following unadorned example: 
“Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.  
The two companies settle under terms that require (1) 
Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the 
patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) 
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Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of 
dollars.”  Id.   
Prior to Actavis, several courts had held that such 
settlement agreements “were immune from antitrust 
scrutiny so long as the asserted anticompetitive effects fell 
within the scope of the patent.”  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d 
at 399.  That categorical rule, known as the “scope of the 
patent” test, relied on the premise that, because a patentee 
possesses a lawful right to keep others out of its market, 
the patentee may also enter into settlement agreements 
excluding potential patent challengers from entering that 
market.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230. 
The Supreme Court rejected that approach.  Its main 
concern was the use of reverse payments “to avoid the risk 
of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.”  
Id. at 2236.  It reasoned that “to refer . . . simply to what 
the holder of a valid patent could do does not by itself 
answer the antitrust question.  The patent . . . may or may 
not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.”  Id. at 
2230–31.  Therefore, “determin[ing] antitrust legality by 
measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely 
against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them 
against procompetitive antitrust policies as well,” would 
be “incongruous.”  Id. at 2231.  Instead, “patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the 
‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently 
antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”  Id.  
Hence, patent-related “reverse payment settlements . . . 
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can sometimes violate the antitrust laws[.]”  King Drug 
Co., 791 F.3d at 399 (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227). 
In determining that reverse payment settlement 
agreements may violate antitrust laws, the Supreme Court 
offered limited guidance as to when such settlements 
should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.  It exempted 
“commonplace forms” of settlement from scrutiny.  
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233.  One such settlement is a 
payment where “a party with a claim (or counterclaim) for 
damages receives a sum equal to or less than the value of 
its claim.”  Id. at 2233 (“[W]hen Company A sues 
Company B for patent infringement and demands, say, 
$100 million in damages, it is not uncommon for B (the 
defendant) to pay A (the plaintiff) some amount less than 
the full demand as part of the settlement—$40 million, for 
example.”).  Another such settlement is a payment by a 
plaintiff (i.e., the patent holder) settling a counterclaim 
made by a defendant (i.e., the alleged patent infringer).  Id. 
(“[I]f B has a counterclaim for damages against A, the 
original infringement plaintiff, A might end up paying B 
to settle B’s counterclaim.”). 
In contrast to those commonplace forms of 
settlement, a reverse payment in pharmaceutical drug 
litigation occurs when “a party with no claim for damages 
(something that is usually true of a paragraph IV litigation 
defendant) walks away with money simply so it will stay 
away from the patentee’s market.”  Id.  At base, reverse 
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payments violate antitrust law when they unjustifiably 
seek “to prevent the risk of competition.”  Id. at 2236.  “If 
the basic reason [for the payment] is a desire to maintain 
and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in 
the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws 
are likely to forbid the arrangement.”  Id. at 2237; see also 
id. at 2236 (“[T]he payment (if otherwise unexplained) 
likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition.  And, as we 
have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm.”).  Stated differently, a reverse 
payment may demonstrate “that the patentee seeks to 
induce the . . . challenger to abandon its claim with a share 
of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the 
competitive market.”  Id. at 2235.   
Reverse payment settlement agreements give rise to 
those antitrust concerns—that is, the concern that a 
settlement seeks “to eliminate risk of patent invalidity or 
noninfringement,” King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 411—when 
the payments are both “large and unjustified.”  Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2237.   
Consideration of the size of the reverse payment 
serves at least two functions in assessing that payment’s 
lawfulness.  First, the Supreme Court observed that a large 
reverse payment may indicate that “the patentee likely 
possesses the power to bring [an unjustified 
anticompetitive] harm about in practice.”  Id. at 2236; see 
also King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 403 (“[T]he size of a 
reverse payment may serve as a proxy for [the power to 
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bring about anticompetitive harm] because a firm without 
such power (and the supracompetitive profits that power 
enables) is unlikely to buy off potential competitors.”).  
That is, a large reverse payment may signal that the 
patentee possessed “the power to charge prices higher than 
the competitive level” and may be using that power to 
keep others from entering its market.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2236.  Second, a large reverse payment may signify that 
the payment seeks to avoid invalidation of the disputed 
underlying patent.  Id. at 2236.  A patent holder may be 
concerned about the validity of its patent, and so the size 
of the payment may very well correspond with the 
magnitude of that concern.  See id. at 2236–37 (“In a word, 
the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a 
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness . . . .”). 
The justifications underlying the reverse payment 
also play a role in determining whether that payment will 
give rise to antitrust liability.  The Supreme Court 
observed, on the one hand, that “[w]here a reverse 
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, . . . 
there is not the same concern [as with other reverse 
payments] that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to 
avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of 
noninfringement.”  Id. at 2236.  Those legitimate 
justifications for a reverse payment include those where 
the payment is “a rough approximation of the litigation 
expenses saved through settlement” or a reflection of 
“compensation for other services the generic has promised 
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to perform.”  Id.  The Supreme Court did not exclude other 
possible legitimate explanations from also justifying 
reverse payment settlement agreements.  Id.  On the other 
hand, in the absence of a legitimate justification or 
explanation, the reverse payment “likely seeks to prevent 
the risk of competition” in that its “objective is to maintain 
supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee 
and the challenger rather than face what might have been 
a competitive market.”  Id. 
“In sum, a reverse payment, where large and 
unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant 
anticompetitive effects . . . .”  Id. at 2237.  Therefore, to 
survive a motion to dismiss when raising an antitrust 
violation under Actavis, “plaintiffs must allege facts 
sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the 
settlement at issue involves a large and unjustified reverse 
payment under Actavis.”  In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust 
Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 552 (1st Cir. 2016).  If plaintiffs do 
so, they may proceed to prove their allegations under the 
traditional antitrust rule-of-reason analysis.  See Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
Since Actavis, this Court has had occasion to assess 
the plausibility of allegations raising an unlawful reverse 
payment settlement agreement.  In King Drug Co. of 
Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., we reached 
two conclusions relevant here regarding the parameters of 
antitrust claims brought under Actavis.   
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First, we held that a reverse payment underlying an 
Actavis antitrust claim need not be in cash form.  791 F.3d 
at 403–09.  The allegedly unlawful reverse payment took 
the form of a “no-AG agreement,” a brand-name 
manufacturer’s promise not to produce an authorized 
generic to compete with the generic manufacturer.  Id. at 
397.  There, the direct purchasers of a drug (Lamictal) 
sued both GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), the brand-name 
manufacturer, and Teva, the generic manufacturer, for 
violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 393.  
The direct purchasers alleged that GSK and Teva entered 
into an agreement settling GSK’s patent infringement suit, 
which contained a no-AG agreement.  Id. at 397.  The no-
AG agreement provided that GSK would not produce an 
authorized generic version of Lamictal for 180 days after 
Teva started marketing its generic.  Id.  The King Drug Co. 
plaintiffs argued that the no-AG agreement could 
constitute an anticompetitive reverse payment under 
Actavis because it worked to maintain supracompetitive 
prices in the Lamictal market.  Id. at 397, 410.  We agreed, 
holding “that a no-AG agreement, when it represents an 
unexplained large transfer of value from the patent holder 
to the alleged infringer, may be subject to antitrust scrutiny 
under the rule of reason.”  Id. at 403. 
We also determined that the plaintiffs in King Drug 
Co. plausibly alleged that the no-AG agreement was a 
large and unjustified reverse payment sufficient to support 
antitrust scrutiny under Actavis.  Id. at 409–10.  The 
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allegations giving rise to antitrust review were that (1) 
“GSK agreed not to launch a competing authorized 
generic during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity period”; (2) 
“GSK had an incentive to launch its own authorized 
generic versions of tablets”; (3) GSK’s promise could be 
“worth many millions of dollars of additional revenue”; 
(4) “Teva had a history of launching ‘at risk’”; and (4) the 
relevant “patent was likely to be invalidated.”  Id.  Given 
those allegations, we reasoned that the complaint plausibly 
alleged that the reverse payment was large and unjustified 
and attempted to prevent the risk of competition through 
the sharing of monopoly profits: “Because marketing an 
authorized generic was allegedly in GSK’s economic 
interest, its agreement not to launch an authorized generic 
was an inducement—valuable to both it and Teva—to 
ensure a longer period of supracompetitive monopoly 
profits based on a patent at risk of being found invalid or 
not infringed.”  Id. at 410. 
In reaching that conclusion, we specifically rejected 
GSK and Teva’s argument that the reverse payment was 
justified because Teva was given permission in the 
settlement agreement to enter a different pharmaceutical 
drug market early.  We observed that, according to the 
complaint, the early-entry provision allowed access to a 
market worth “only $50 million annually,” which “was 
orders of magnitude smaller than the alleged $2 billion . . . 
market the agreement is said to have protected.”  Id.  The 
early-entry provision thus failed to justify the large reverse 
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payment from the patentee GSK to the alleged infringer 
Teva.  Id.  Because the complaint in King Drug Co. 
plausibly alleged a large and unjustified reverse payment, 
the plaintiffs there could proceed to prove their claim 
through “the traditional rule-of-reason approach.”  Id. at 
411; see also id. at 412 (providing a three-step rule-of-
reason approach by which antitrust plaintiffs could 
demonstrate that the reverse payment settlement 
agreement imposed an unreasonable restraint on 
competition).  
Applying Actavis and King Drug Co., we next 
address whether the complaints in the Lipitor and Effexor 
consolidated appeals plausibly allege an actionable 
reverse payment settlement agreement. 
A 
We conclude that Lipitor plaintiffs have plausibly 
pled an unlawful reverse payment settlement agreement.9  
Their allegations sufficiently allege that Pfizer agreed to 
release the Accupril claims against Ranbaxy, which were 
likely to succeed and worth hundreds of millions of 
                                                   
9 This conclusion renders unnecessary the need to address 
the Lipitor direct purchasers’ argument that they should be 
granted leave to submit a new complaint with economic 
calculations to bolster their allegations of an unlawful 
reverse payment.   
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dollars, in exchange for Ranbaxy’s delay in the release of 
its generic version of Lipitor.   
As part of their effort to allege an unlawful reverse 
payment settlement agreement, Lipitor plaintiffs plead, 
among other factual averments, the following: Ranbaxy 
launched a generic version of Pfizer’s brand drug Accupril 
“at risk,” Lipitor JA257 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 149); 
Pfizer had annual Accupril sales over $500 million prior 
to Ranbaxy’s launch, id.; Pfizer brought suit and sought to 
enjoin Ranbaxy’s generic sales, Lipitor JA260 (DPP Sec. 
Am. Compl. ¶ 160); the District Court granted the 
injunction halting Ranbaxy’s sales of generic Accupril, 
which the Federal Circuit affirmed, Pfizer Inc. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Pfizer posted “a $200 million bond in conjunction with” 
the injunction and informed the Court that Ranbaxy’s 
generic sales “decimated” its Accupril sales, Lipitor 
JA260 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 160); more specifically, 
Pfizer’s Accupril sales dropped from $525 million in 2004 
to $71 million in 2005 following Ranbaxy’s launch of the 
generic version of Accupril, Lipitor JA260 (DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 160); Pfizer’s suit was likely to be successful, 
Lipitor JA262–63 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167–70); and 
Pfizer itself made statements about Ranbaxy’s exposure, 
estimating that Ranbaxy faced “very, very substantial 
damages in the way of lost profits,” Lipitor JA263 (DPP 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 170).   
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Despite the large expected damages arising from the 
Accupril suit and the high likelihood of its success, Pfizer 
subsequently released its Accupril claims as part of a 
settlement agreement with Ranbaxy.  Ranbaxy paid $1 
million to Pfizer in connection with the Accupril litigation 
and also agreed to the release of Pfizer’s $200 million 
injunction bond.  Lipitor plaintiffs allege that the release 
of the Accupril claims was unjustified, as the release of 
potential liability in Accupril “far exceeded” any of 
Pfizer’s saved litigation costs or any services provided by 
Ranbaxy.  Lipitor JA265 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 180, 
285).  Pfizer’s alleged agreement to release the Accupril 
claims, therefore, “was an inducement—valuable to both 
it and [Ranbaxy]—to ensure a longer period of 
supracompetitive monopoly profits based on [the Lipitor 
patent, which was] at risk of being found invalid or not 
infringed.”  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 410.  Those 
allegations sufficiently plead that the value of the Accupril 
claims was large and their release was unjustified.  See 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (“[T]he payment (if otherwise 
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of 
competition. . . .  [T]hat consequence constitutes the 
relevant anticompetitive harm.”). 
Notwithstanding Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations, the 
District Court determined their complaints were wanting.  
It required that they plead a “reliable” monetary estimate 
of the dropped Accupril claims so that they “may be 
analyzed against the Actavis factors” to determine whether 
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the value of those claims “is ‘large’ once the subtraction 
of legal fees and other services provided by generics 
occurs.”  See Lipitor II, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 543.  That 
“reliable” monetary estimate, according to the Court, 
necessitated a series of calculations: a valuation of Pfizer’s 
damages in the Accupril litigation incorporating both 
Pfizer’s probability of success in that action and an 
estimation of Pfizer’s lost profits; a discounting of Pfizer’s 
damages based on its saved litigation costs and Pfizer’s 
various litigation risks; and an accounting of various other 
provisions within the settlement agreement, including the 
arrangement to allow Ranbaxy into several foreign 
markets, the parties’ agreement resolving other 
pharmaceutical litigation, and a supply arrangement 
between Ranbaxy and Pfizer related to generic Lipitor 
sales in Canada.  Without these various calculations, the 
District Court determined that Lipitor plaintiffs had failed 
to allege a plausible large and unjustified reverse payment 
under Actavis.   
Lipitor defendants largely echo the reasoning of the 
District Court.  Their contentions broadly fall into two 
categories.  First, and similar to the District Court, Lipitor 
defendants maintain that, even if the settlement could be 
characterized as an unlawful reverse payment, Lipitor 
plaintiffs insufficiently alleged the payment was “large” 
and “unjustified.”  Second, they argue that the settlement 
here was no more than the sort of commonplace settlement 
 56 
 
that the Supreme Court excluded from antitrust scrutiny.  
Neither of these arguments withstands careful review. 
Both the District Court and Lipitor defendants offer 
a heightened pleading standard contrary to Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Twombly and Iqbal require 
only plausibility, a standard “not akin to a ‘probability 
requirement.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  While Twombly 
and Iqbal require that “[f]actual allegations . . . be enough 
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, “those cases make it clear that 
a claimant does not have to ‘set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim.’”  Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of 
Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3); see also 
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.”).   
Applying that pleading standard, neither the 
Supreme Court in Actavis nor this Court in King Drug Co. 
demanded the level of detail the District Court and Lipitor 
defendants would require.  For its part, the Supreme Court 
in Actavis was deliberately opaque about the parameters 
of reverse payment antitrust claims.  We take note, though, 
of the allegations in Actavis regarding the size of the 
reverse payment.  There, the FTC alleged simply that a 
patentee “agreed to pay [a generic manufacturer] $10 
million per year for six years,” “agreed to pay [another 
generic manufacturer] $2 million per year for six years,” 
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and “projected that it would pay [a third generic 
manufacturer] about $19 million during the first year of its 
agreement, rising to over $30 million annually by the end 
of the deal.”  Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive 
and Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 66, 77, In re Androgel 
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:09-CV-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga. May 
28, 2009), ECF No. 134.  The FTC’s complaint did not 
preemptively negate justifications for the reverse 
payments.  It simply alleged that the payments were meant 
to, and did, induce delay of likely successful patent 
challenges through the sharing of monopoly profits.  Id. 
¶¶ 67, 86; see also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.  The 
Supreme Court did not require the advanced valuations 
asked for by Lipitor defendants and required by the 
District Court.   
Perhaps equally striking in their simplicity are the 
allegations we concluded were sufficient to state an 
Actavis claim in King Drug Co.  There, we elucidated no 
special valuation requirement in examining the alleged 
reverse payment.  Rather, the allegations were simply that 
a no-AG agreement provided the alleged infringer with 
“many millions of dollars of additional revenue” and that 
the patentee otherwise had “an incentive to launch its own 
authorized generic.”  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 409–10.  
The no-AG agreement resultantly induced the alleged 
infringer to agree to delay the launch of its generic drug 
that would compete with the patentee’s drug, which 
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purportedly relied on an invalid patent.  Id.  Nothing more 
was necessary to plausibly plead a claim under Actavis. 
The allegations here, as outlined above, easily 
match, if not exceed, the level of specificity and detail of 
those in Actavis and King Drug Co.  The alleged reverse 
payment here was “large” enough to permit a plausible 
inference that Pfizer possessed the power to bring about 
an unjustified anticompetitive harm through its patents and 
had serious doubts about the ability of those patents to 
lawfully prevent competition.10  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2236.  Pfizer purportedly suffered hundreds of millions of 
dollars in lost sales following Ranbaxy’s entry into the 
Accupril market.  Lipitor JA260 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. 
¶ 160).  Upon suing Ranbaxy, Pfizer sought treble 
damages, Lipitor JA263–64 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 
159, 172–74), and posted a $200 million bond to secure an 
injunction, “demonstrating that Pfizer placed great value 
on preserving its Accupril franchise,” Lipitor JA260 (DPP 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 160).  That claim had some likelihood 
of success given the entry of the injunction, which was 
affirmed on appeal.  See Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1383.  Pfizer 
itself told shareholders that it was likely to succeed on the 
merits of the case.  Lipitor JA263 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. 
                                                   
10 Notably, Lipitor plaintiffs do not allege the size or value 
of Pfizer’s grant to Ranbaxy of early access into several 
foreign markets for Lipitor.   
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¶ 170).  Despite those losses and the likely success of that 
litigation against Ranbaxy, Pfizer released its claim worth 
“hundreds of millions of dollars.”  JA264 (DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 175).  Those allegations sufficiently allege a 
large reverse payment; more detailed, advanced 
calculations related to those allegations may come later.11 
                                                   
11 As explained infra, not only does Lipitor defendants’ 
request for detailed economic analyses go beyond what is 
required at this stage of the litigation, but that request also 
attempts to require Lipitor plaintiffs to disprove what 
Lipitor defendants must prove.  Lipitor defendants suggest 
that the size of the reverse payment must be determined by 
the net reverse payment, which accounts for litigation 
costs and other discounting measures and justifications for 
the payment.  In doing so, Lipitor defendants seem to 
conflate the Actavis requirement that the reverse payment 
be “large” with the requirement that the payment be 
“unjustified.”  Their proposed economic valuation 
demands that Lipitor plaintiffs disprove proffered 
justifications for the reverse payment settlement 
agreement.  Lipitor plaintiffs, though, need not do so at the 
pleading stage.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (“An antitrust 
defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that 
legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the 
presence of the challenged term and showing the 
lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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The alleged reverse payment here was also 
“unjustified.”  As noted earlier, avoiding litigation costs, 
providing payment for services, or other consideration 
may justify a large reverse payment.  See Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2236.  To plausibly allege an unjustified reverse 
payment, an antitrust plaintiff need only allege the absence 
of a “convincing justification” for the payment.  Id. at 
2236–37 (observing that, if such considerations are 
present, “there is not the same concern that a patentee is 
using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent 
invalidation or a finding of noninfringement”); see also 
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 412 (observing that, in the first 
step of the rule-of-reason analysis, a plaintiff must “prove 
a payment for delay, or, in other words, payment to 
prevent the risk of competition,” and then citing Actavis 
for the proposition that the “likelihood of a reverse 
payment bringing about anticompetitive effects” depends 
on its size, anticipated litigation costs, its independence 
from other services rendered, and other justifications).   
Lipitor plaintiffs’ complaints state that the value of 
the released Accupril claims “far exceed[s] any litigation 
costs (in any or all cases) Pfizer avoided by settling.”  
Lipitor JA265 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 180).  While 
Lipitor defendants speculate as to the actual saved 
litigation costs, all that need be alleged, at this juncture, is 
that those costs fail to explain the hundreds of millions of 
dollars of liability released by Pfizer.  Lipitor plaintiffs 
have alleged just that, and the finely calibrated litigation 
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cost estimates requested by Lipitor defendants and the 
District Court are unnecessary at this stage in the 
litigation.   
Lipitor defendants also argue that the alleged 
reverse payment was pled out of context, as the Accupril 
litigation settlement was part of a larger, global settlement 
agreement between Pfizer and Ranbaxy.  Specifically, 
they point out that the complaints do not address other 
aspects of the settlement agreement, namely a supply 
arrangement in Canada and resolution of litigation over 
another pharmaceutical drug, Caduet.12  They are correct 
that the complaints make little mention of those aspects of 
                                                   
12 The Lipitor parties differ as to whether, under the 
Sherman Act, foreign or out-of-market procompetitive 
effects of the settlement agreement, like the Canadian 
supply arrangement and settlement of the Caduet 
litigation, can justify the domestic or in-market 
anticompetitive effects of the settlement, namely 
Ranbaxy’s delayed entry into the U.S. Lipitor market.  We 
need not decide that issue, as Lipitor plaintiffs have, at 
least at this point in the litigation, plausibly alleged the 
absence of justifications for the reverse payment.  See 
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 410 n.34 (“It may also be 
(though we do not decide) that procompetitive effects in 
one market cannot justify anticompetitive effects in a 
separate market.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
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the settlement.  We disagree that the absence of those 
allegations is fatal. 
Lipitor defendants have the burden of justifying the 
rather large reverse payment here, and they offer no reason 
why those other elements of the settlement agreement do 
so.  Actavis does not require antitrust plaintiffs to come up 
with possible explanations for the reverse payment and 
then rebut those explanations in response to a motion to 
dismiss.  The Supreme Court clearly placed the onus of 
explaining or justifying a large reverse payment on 
antitrust defendants.  In examining allegations of a reverse 
payment at the pleading stage, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that, even if there is an explanation for a 
reverse payment, “that possibility d[id] not justify 
dismissing the [antitrust plaintiff’s] complaint.  An 
antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding 
that legitimate justifications are present, thereby 
explaining the presence of the challenged term and 
showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of 
reason.”  Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).  The Supreme 
Court emphasized this point later, in Actavis, stating that 
the “one who makes [the reverse] payment” needs “to 
explain and to justify it.”  Id. at 2237.  We noted as much 
in King Drug Co., where we observed that the antitrust 
defendant has the burden “to show ‘that legitimate 
justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence 
of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of that 
term under the rule of reason.’”  791 F.3d at 412 (quoting 
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235–36); see also In re Niaspan 
Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“While it is possible that defendants will be able to supply 
evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the true 
value of the services . . . , Twombly does not require an 
antitrust plaintiff to plead facts that, if true, definitively 
rule out all possible innocent explanations.”).  Here, 
Lipitor plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the absence of a 
convincing justification for the reverse payment and were 
not required to plead more than that.   
Our conclusion here is consistent with the 
persuasive decisions of other courts facing similar 
challenges to pleadings raising an antitrust claim under 
Actavis.  For example, in In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust 
Litigation, a patentee entered into a no-AG agreement with 
a generic manufacturer, providing the generic 
manufacturer with favorable promotion deals in exchange 
for the generic manufacturer’s delaying entry into the 
patentee’s market.  814 F.3d at 541.  Addressing the 
specificity necessary for allegations raising an antitrust 
claim under Actavis, the First Circuit held: “Consistent 
with Twombly, which declined to ‘require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics’ [in an antitrust suit], we do not 
require that the plaintiffs provide precise figures and 
calculations at the pleading stage.”  Id. at 552 (citations 
omitted).  To conclude otherwise “would impose a nearly 
insurmountable bar for plaintiffs at the pleading stage” 
because “very precise and particularized estimates of fair 
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value and anticipated litigation costs may require evidence 
in the exclusive possession of the defendants, as well as 
expert analysis.”  Id. (quoting In re Aggrenox Antitrust 
Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D. Conn. 2015)).  The First 
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs must simply “allege facts 
sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the 
settlement at issue involves a large and unjustified reverse 
payment under Actavis.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Finally, Lipitor defendants contend that the reverse 
payment here was no more than a commonplace 
settlement.  That argument is unpersuasive.  As they would 
have it, the exchange of Ranbaxy’s $1 million payment to 
Pfizer for Pfizer’s release of the claim in the Accupril 
action (allegedly worth hundreds of millions of dollars) 
constituted a lawful compromise warranting no antitrust 
scrutiny.  Lipitor defendants rely on the Supreme Court’s 
warning in Actavis that its opinion “should not be read to 
subject to antitrust scrutiny ‘commonplace forms’ of 
settlement, such as tender by an infringer of less than the 
patentee’s full demand.”  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 402 
(quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233).  We doubt that the 
$1 million payment from Ranbaxy to Pfizer, in exchange 
for an agreement not to enter a patentee’s market, insulates 
review of the settlement agreement here.  If parties could 
shield their settlements from antitrust review by simply 
including a token payment by the purportedly infringing 
generic manufacturer, then otherwise unlawful reverse 
payment settlement agreements attempting to eliminate 
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the risk of competition would escape review.  That result 
simply cannot be squared with Actavis.   
More importantly, Lipitor defendants’ argument 
that the settlement agreement here is a commonplace one 
does not withstand Lipitor plaintiffs’ plausible allegations 
and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom.  As 
referenced above, the Lipitor complaints plausibly allege 
that, while Ranbaxy gave Pfizer $1 million, Pfizer’s 
release of the Accupril claims was given “[i]n exchange 
for Ranbaxy’s agreement to delay its launch of (and not to 
authorize another ANDA filer to launch) generic Lipitor 
until November 30, 2011,” not in exchange for the $1 
million.  Lipitor JA257 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 48).  
Bolstering that allegation is Lipitor plaintiffs’ contention 
that the Accupril claims were worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars to Pfizer and were likely to be successful.  The 
$1 million payment is paltry by comparison.  Given those 
allegations, Pfizer’s release of the Accupril claims 
plausibly sought to induce Ranbaxy to delay its entry into 
the Lipitor market and was not in exchange for Ranbaxy’s 
$1 million.  Cf. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (“The 
companies described these payments as compensation for 
other services the generics promised to perform, but the 
FTC contends the other services had little value.  
According to the FTC the true point of the payments was 
to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete . . . 
until 2015.”).  Pfizer and Ranbaxy’s settlement agreement 
is therefore properly subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
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B 
Applying the same analysis to the Effexor 
consolidated appeals as we applied above compels the 
same result.  We conclude that Effexor plaintiffs plausibly 
allege a reverse payment settlement agreement under 
Actavis. 
As with the Lipitor appeals, we begin with a brief 
recitation of key allegations.  Effexor plaintiffs allege that, 
after Teva filed an ANDA seeking approval of its generic 
version of Effexor XR, Wyeth brought suit.  Following a 
ruling adverse to Wyeth, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement.  As part of that agreement, Wyeth 
agreed it would not compete with Teva by producing an 
authorized generic of either Effexor XR or Effexor IR.  
That no-AG agreement allegedly “constituted a 
substantial, net payment by Wyeth to Teva in exchange for 
Teva agreeing to delay generic entry much later than it 
otherwise would have.”  Effexor JA210 (DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 281).13  More specifically, Effexor plaintiffs 
claim that the promise “amount[ed] to over $500 million 
in value” given to Teva.  Id.  In return for that value, Teva 
agreed it would delay entry into the Effexor XR market by 
not selling its generic version of the drug until a specified 
                                                   
13 Because Effexor plaintiffs’ complaints contain 
substantively identical factual allegations, we cite only to 
the direct purchasers’ complaint, referring to their second 
amended complaint as “DPP Sec. Am. Compl.” 
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date. According to Effexor plaintiffs, Teva’s promise to 
delay entry of its generic Effexor XR “meant that U.S. 
drug purchasers paid billions of dollars more for extended-
release venlafaxine than they otherwise would have absent 
the Wyeth-Teva agreement.”  Effexor JA210 (DPP Sec. 
Am. Compl. ¶ 279).  Wyeth was thus able to profit 
substantially from Teva’s promise to delay the entry of its 
generic into the Effexor XR market. 
The District Court concluded that those allegations 
insufficiently pled a large and unjustified reverse payment.  
It determined that Effexor plaintiffs had not alleged that 
the reverse payment here was “large” because their 
“analysis . . . [did] not have a reliable foundation.”14  In re 
                                                   
14 Reliability is often associated with the evidentiary 
standard applicable to expert testimony, see Rule 702(c) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, not the pleading 
standard required to survive a motion to dismiss.  As the 
Amicus Brief submitted by the American Antitrust 
Institute points out, the District Court even seems to have 
suggested that Effexor plaintiffs at the pleading stage 
should have produced evidence in order to make their 
allegation plausible: “Since the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs 
fail to provide appropriate evidence for the Court to 
determine the value of the payment, the allegations in the 
Complaint do not reach the plausibility standard 
established in Iqbal and Twombly.”  In re Effexor XR 
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Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410, at *23.  
Lacking that reliable foundation, their allegation of a large 
reverse payment was, in the District Court’s view, 
implausible.  Effexor defendants make this same argument 
on appeal.  Effexor plaintiffs purportedly failed to allege 
the specific benefit accruing to Teva from the settlement 
agreement and instead relied on “various general 
assumptions about generic penetration rates and pricing 
impacts.”  Wyeth Br. 46.  Effexor defendants also argue 
the reverse payment was not large because the complaints 
here failed to sufficiently allege that Wyeth would have 
released an authorized generic but for its settlement 
agreement with Teva.  Finally, they argue that the reverse 
payment may be explained by another provision in the 
settlement agreement that requires Teva to pay Wyeth 
certain royalties for its Effexor sales.  Those arguments, 
though, ask too much of Effexor plaintiffs at this stage of 
the litigation.  Their allegations, as outlined above, 
sufficiently allege a reverse payment settlement agreement 
as laid out by the Supreme Court in Actavis. 
Similar to the Lipitor appeals, the District Court and 
Effexor defendants request a level of pleading exceeding 
what Twombly and Iqbal require.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Moreover, neither the 
Supreme Court in Actavis nor this Court in King Drug Co. 
                                                   
Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410, at *23 (emphasis 
added); American Antitrust Institute Amicus Br. 10. 
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required such detailed allegations at the pleading stage.  
The complaint in Actavis simply alleged that the patentee 
paid various sums of money to generic manufacturers to 
induce them to delay their entry into the patentee’s 
pharmaceutical drug market.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2229.  Likewise, in King Drug Co., this Court viewed as 
sufficient allegations that the patentee agreed not to 
market an authorized generic to compete with a generic 
manufacturer, with that promise worth “many millions of 
dollars of additional revenue,” thereby inducing the 
generic manufacturer to delay its entry into the patentee’s 
market.  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 410.  The facts alleged 
by Effexor plaintiffs similarly, and thus plausibly, allege 
that Wyeth leveraged its extremely valuable promise not 
to enter the generic market with an authorized generic in 
exchange for Teva’s promise to delay entry into the 
Effexor XR market.  See King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 409 
(allegations that patentee “sought to induce [the generic 
manufacturer] to delay its entry into the [relevant 
pharmaceutical drug] market by way of an unjustified no-
AG agreement” sufficiently stated a claim “under 
Twombly and Iqbal for violation of the Sherman Act”); see 
also Loestrin, 814 F.3d at 552 (“[P]laintiffs must allege 
facts sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the 
settlement at issue involves a large and unjustified reverse 
payment under Actavis.”). 
First, the alleged reverse payment, here in the form 
of Wyeth’s no-AG agreement, is plausibly large.  The no-
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AG agreement used by Wyeth to induce Teva to stay out 
of the Effexor XR market was alleged to have been worth 
more than $500 million.  Effexor plaintiffs note that the 
Effexor XR market is a multi-billion dollar market 
annually, and, with the no-AG agreement, “Teva would (a) 
garner all of the sales of generic Effexor XR during Teva’s 
generic exclusivity period . . . and (b) charge higher prices 
than it would have been able to charge if it was competing 
with Wyeth’s authorized generic.”  Effexor JA211 (DPP 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 282).  Effexor plaintiffs further cite 
several aggregate studies noting that, historically, 
authorized-generic versions of a drug bring down the price 
of the generic drug, with one study observing that the entry 
“of an authorized generic causes generic prices to be 16% 
lower than when there is no authorized generic.”  Effexor 
JA147 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58–60).  Those 
allegations plausibly allege a large reverse payment, with 
Wyeth’s no-AG agreement “allow[ing] Teva to maintain 
a supra-competitive generic price as the only generic 
manufacturer on the market, and to earn substantially 
higher profits than it otherwise would have earned.”  
Effexor JA214–15 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 292).  
Effexor defendants nevertheless respond that the 
payment in this case cannot plausibly constitute a large 
reverse payment because of Effexor plaintiffs’ “failure to 
plead that Wyeth plausibly would have introduced an AG 
absent the settlement.”  Wyeth Br. 36.  They argue that 
Wyeth has rarely introduced authorized generics in 
 71 
 
response to the entry of a generic into one of their branded 
drugs’ markets and that, according to an FTC study, 
Wyeth “lack[ed] an ‘AG Strategy.’”  Id. at 34; see also 
Effexor JA1756–77 (a FTC study indicating that Wyeth 
released few authorized generics).  Effexor defendants 
thus contend that Wyeth’s no-AG agreement really gave 
Teva little value in return for the latter’s delay because 
Wyeth was not going to produce an authorized generic 
anyway.  Wyeth’s behavior in the absence of the 
agreement is certainly disputed.  Yet Effexor plaintiffs 
state facts plausibly alleging that Wyeth would have 
produced an authorized generic but for the no-AG 
agreement.  They claim that “[t]ypically, once a drug goes 
generic, the branded manufacturer sells both the branded 
version and an ‘authorized’ generic version, usually 
selling the same exact pills in different bottles.”  Effexor 
JA206 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 265).  More specifically, 
they allege, “Wyeth could have launched (and, but for its 
anticompetitive deal, would have launched) its own 
authorized generic at or about the time that Teva launched 
its generic.”  Effexor JA208–09 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. 
¶ 276).  Moreover, while the FTC study cited by Effexor 
defendants notes that Wyeth introduced only one 
authorized generic between 2001 and 2008, the study does 
not specifically analyze Wyeth or suggest that Wyeth 
would not have introduced an authorized generic with 
respect to Effexor.  And even Effexor defendants admit 
that Wyeth had introduced at least one authorized generic 
in the past.  Wyeth Br. 36 & n.11.  So, the FTC study is, at 
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best, evidence that Wyeth may not have introduced an 
authorized generic here, but it does not make Effexor 
plaintiffs’ allegations implausible at the pleading stage 
where we again consider plausibility, not probability.  
Effexor defendants have not—by merely arguing that 
Wyeth does not typically introduce authorized generics 
into the market—rendered the allegations about the value 
of the no-AG agreement implausible. 
Second, the alleged reverse payment made through 
Wyeth’s no-AG agreement is plausibly unjustified.  As 
alleged, the no-AG agreement “cannot be excused as a 
litigation cost avoidance effort by Wyeth.”  Effexor JA212 
(DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 285).  Effexor plaintiffs’ 
complaint states that Wyeth’s litigation costs with Teva 
would have totaled only between $5 million to $10 
million, and those costs “would have been the tiniest of a 
fraction the size of the payment likely over $500 million 
effectuated by Wyeth to Teva.” Id.  They allege further 
that the no-AG agreement is not “justified on any 
procompetitive basis,” asserting that no exchange of goods 
or services or any explanation justifies the delay of Teva’s 
entry into the Effexor XR market other than the settlement 
agreement.  Effexor JA212 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl.  
¶¶ 286–87). 
Effexor defendants respond that the settlement 
agreement is not subject to antitrust scrutiny because the 
agreement is “traditional” in that it is justified by Teva’s 
payment of royalties to Wyeth.  Effexor defendants further 
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argue that the complaints do not include allegations about 
the settlement agreement’s royalty licensing agreements 
when alleging Teva’s receipt of the $500 million no-AG 
agreement.  Wyeth Br. 49–51.  These arguments do not 
undermine the plausibility of the complaints’ allegations 
that the no-AG agreement was entered into in exchange 
for the delayed entry of Teva into the Effexor markets.  As 
the agreement indicates, Teva paid Wyeth only 15% of its 
profits for the first 6 months.  The rate then jumped to 50% 
and then 65% after that.  Thus, while the royalty licensing 
provisions may show that the no-AG agreement is 
ultimately worth less than it otherwise would have been, 
Effexor plaintiffs’ allegations are still plausible.  See King 
Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 410 (concluding that a settlement 
agreement provision allowing access to a market worth 
“only $50 million annually” failed to make plaintiffs’ 
Actavis allegations implausible because the value of that 
provision “was orders of magnitude smaller than the 
alleged $2 billion . . . market the agreement [was] said to 
have protected”).  Although the royalty licensing 
provisions will perhaps be a valid defense, they require 
factual assessments, economic calculations, and expert 
analysis that are inappropriate at the pleading stage.  
Effexor plaintiffs, again, need not allege any more at this 
stage of the litigation.15   
                                                   
15 The procedural history related to the royalty licensing 
provisions further supports our conclusion.  The Effexor 
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direct purchasers filed a motion for leave to file a second 
amended consolidated complaint on August 28, 2013, 
attaching their proposed complaint.  A week after 
receiving this proposed second amended complaint, 
Effexor defendants sent Effexor plaintiffs a copy of the un-
redacted agreement containing details about the royalties, 
coming mere days before oral argument on Effexor 
plaintiffs’ request to amend.  Despite the timing of its 
disclosure, Effexor defendants would have this panel 
affirm the dismissal of all the complaints, without giving 
any Effexor plaintiffs, even those other than the direct 
purchasers, a chance to amend.  Given this procedural 
background, dismissal based on the absence of detailed, 
expert-derived allegations explaining the royalty 
licenses—as requested by Effexor defendants—would be 
inappropriate.  This procedural history serves to 
underscore the concern that requiring the heightened level 
of specificity requested here would make settlement 
agreements like this one nearly impossible to challenge 
because the details of the agreements are closely guarded 
by the parties entering into them.  American Antitrust 
Institute Amicus Br. 6–7.  Accordingly, it was appropriate 
to look to general assumptions about authorized generics 
to determine the value of the agreement based on the 
information available to Effexor plaintiffs.  They need not 
have brought in experts to assess the settlement based on 
the limited information they had. 
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In sum, Effexor plaintiffs need not have valued the 
no-AG agreement beyond their allegations summarized 
above.  See Loestrin, 814 F.3d at 552; King Drug Co., 791 
F.3d at 409–10.  Nor were they required to counter 
potential defenses at the pleading stage.  Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2236.  Their complaints contain sufficient factual 
detail about the settlement agreement between Teva and 
Wyeth to plausibly suggest that Wyeth paid Teva to stay 
out of the market by way of its no-AG agreement; that is 
the very anticompetitive harm that the Supreme Court 
identified in Actavis.  Id. (“[T]he payment (if otherwise 
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of 
competition.  And, as we have said, that consequence 
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”); see also 
id. (identifying the anticompetitive harm as “the 
payment’s objective . . . to maintain supracompetitive 
prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger 
rather than face what might have been a competitive 
market”).  While Effexor defendants may ultimately be 
able to show that the payments were not in fact large or 
unjustified, that determination should not have been made 
at the pleading stage given the plausible allegations here.     
Effexor defendants also attempt to support the 
District Court’s decision to grant their motion to dismiss 
on two other, independent grounds.  First, they argue that 
the FTC’s failure to object to their settlement agreement 
prevents Effexor plaintiffs from now bringing an antirust 
challenge to that agreement.  Second, they contend that the 
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes their settlement 
agreement from antitrust scrutiny.  Neither argument 
prevails. 
1 
Effexor defendants argue that “Wyeth [could] not 
possibly have sought to illicitly ‘pay’ Teva [because] it 
submitted the settlement in full to the District Court for 
antitrust review and the District Court specifically invited 
the FTC to voice concerns, and then the FTC raised no 
objections.”  Wyeth Br. 55.  Essentially, Effexor 
defendants contend that (1) by submitting the agreement 
to the FTC in 2005, Wyeth lacked any anticompetitive 
intent; (2) while not dispositive, the lack of 
anticompetitive intent is “useful in determining whether a 
settlement should be viewed as” an unlawful reverse 
payment settlement agreement or a traditional settlement 
agreement, id.; and (3) the FTC’s failure to object 
effectively sanctioned the settlement agreement.  The 
District Court agreed, explaining that “any alleged 
antitrust intent held by the parties is negated by the fact 
that the settlement and license agreements were forwarded 
to the FTC.”  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 
4988410, at *24.  And, although the FTC reserved its 
rights in response to Wyeth’s submission, the District 
Court found that reservation of rights “unconvincing,” 
concluding that “when a governmental agency receives an 
invitation from the Court to intercede in a matter by way 
of an Order, that agency should respond appropriately, not 
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simply reserve that right for the future.”  Id.  We 
disagree—the submission of the settlement agreement to 
the FTC here does not protect the settlement agreement 
from antitrust scrutiny under Actavis. 
First, the District Court failed to draw all reasonable 
inferences in Effexor plaintiffs’ favor.  Wyeth’s 
compliance with the 2002 consent decree fails to 
demonstrate that Wyeth somehow lacked anticompetitive 
intent.  It was complying with a legal obligation, not acting 
altruistically.  Similarly, in addition to Wyeth’s 
submission to the FTC from the 2002 consent decree, Teva 
and Wyeth had to submit the settlement to the FTC for 
review under the MMA.  § 1112, 117 Stat. at 2461–63.  
Therefore, taking reasonable inferences in Effexor 
plaintiffs’ favor, compliance with the 2002 consent decree 
and the MMA through the submission of the settlement 
agreement simply indicates mere compliance with the law, 
not the lack of antitrust intent.   
Even if the submission of the settlement agreement 
to the FTC could create an inference that Wyeth somehow 
lacked antitrust intent, that intent is not an element of an 
antitrust claim, and benign intent does not shield 
anticompetitive conduct from liability.  A party’s “good 
intention” cannot “save an otherwise objectionable 
[restraint of trade].”  Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  The antitrust inquiry “is 
confined to a consideration of impact on competitive 
conditions,” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
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435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978), and “good motives will not 
validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice,” NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 
(1984).  Accordingly, the District Court erred in giving 
significant weight to the parties’ compliance with the 2002 
consent decree and MMA. 
Finally, it is erroneous to conclude that the FTC’s 
inaction equates to a determination that the settlement 
agreement does not run afoul of the Sherman Act, 
especially given the circumstances here.  Generally, an 
agency decision on whether to act in a particular matter or 
at a particular time “often involves a complicated 
balancing” of factors: the agency must “assess whether a 
violation has occurred,” “whether agency resources are 
best spent” on that matter, whether that particular action 
“best fits the agency’s overall policies, and indeed whether 
the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at 
all.”  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  
Reading agency tea leaves is therefore a vexing prospect, 
made all the more difficult given the limited scope of 
review on a motion to dismiss.   
The circumstances here bear out that observation.  
Following the submission of the settlement agreement in 
2005, the FTC offered no objection but explicitly reserved 
its rights to take later action on the agreement.  That 
express reservation alone raises the plausible inference 
that the FTC had not accepted the legality of the 
agreement.  Moreover, the MMA includes a savings clause 
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which explains that the FTC’s failure to object does not 
prevent later litigation over the agreement: 
Any action taken by . . . the [FTC], or any 
failure of . . . the [FTC] to take action, under 
this subtitle shall not at any time bar any 
proceeding or any action with respect to any 
agreement between a brand name drug 
company and a generic drug applicant, or any 
agreement between generic drug applicants, 
under any other provision of law, nor shall 
any filing under this subtitle constitute or 
create a presumption of any violation of any 
competition laws. 
§ 1117, 117 Stat. at 2463.  Thus, even though the FTC 
expressly reserved its rights, it did not have to do so under 
the law.  Again, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
Effexor plaintiffs’ favor, the FTC’s failure to object here 
constitutes no waiver of objection to or affirmance of the 
settlement agreement. 
Thus, the District Court erred in concluding that the 
submission of the settlement agreement to the FTC and the 
FTC’s lack of response immunized Effexor defendants’ 
settlement agreement from antitrust scrutiny under 
Actavis.   
2 
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Effexor defendants finally contend that “[d]ismissal 
is appropriate for the independent reason that the 
[settlement agreement] became operative only after the 
district court overseeing the patent case incorporated the 
terms into a court order requested by the parties.”  Wyeth 
Br. 61.  They cite the District Court’s one-page consent 
decree adopting the terms of the settlement.  According to 
them, “the operation of the settlement . . . result[s] from 
government action—stemming from constitutionally 
protected petitioning activity.”  Id.   
Essentially, Effexor defendants argue that, because 
they submitted the proposed settlement agreement to the 
District Court for confirmation, Noerr-Pennington16 
immunity inoculates the settlement agreement from 
antitrust scrutiny.  “Rooted in the First Amendment and 
fears about the threat of chilling political speech,” Noerr-
Pennington immunity provides “immun[ity] from antitrust 
liability” to parties “who petition[ ] the government for 
redress.”  A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 
263 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 2001).  That immunity “applies 
to actions which might otherwise violate the Sherman Act 
because ‘[t]he federal antitrust laws do not regulate the 
conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive 
action from the government.’”  Id. at 250–51 (quoting City 
                                                   
16 Named after Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
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of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
379–80 (1991)).   
However, “[t]he scope of Noerr-Pennington 
immunity . . . depends on the ‘source, context, and nature 
of the competitive restraint at issue.’”  Id. at 251 (quoting 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 499 (1988)).  On the one hand, parties may be 
immune from liability for “the antitrust injuries which 
result from the [government] petitioning itself” or “the 
antitrust injuries caused by government action which 
results from the petitioning.”  Id. (emphasis added).  On 
the other hand, “[i]f the restraint directly results from 
private action there is no immunity.”  Id.  That is, 
immunity will not categorically apply to private actions 
somehow involving government action.  “Passive 
government approval is insufficient.  Private parties 
cannot immunize an anticompetitive agreement merely by 
subsequently requesting legislative approval.”  Id.  A 
distinction therefore exists between merely urging the 
government to restrain trade and asking the government to 
adopt or enforce a private agreement.  Government 
advocacy is protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity; 
seeking governmental approval of a private agreement is 
not.   
Effexor defendants argue that the effect of the 
settlement agreement at issue “was dependent entirely on 
the action of the court” and is therefore protected.  Wyeth 
Br. 63.  We are not persuaded.  The Supreme Court 
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explained in Local No. 93, International Association of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986), 
that, while consent decrees are at some level judicial acts, 
a court’s role in entering a consent judgment differs 
fundamentally from its role in actually adjudicating a 
dispute.  Id. at 519–22.  When parties pursue litigation, 
courts reach determinations of facts and applicable law via 
the adversary process.  But when courts enter consent 
decrees, “it is the agreement of the parties, rather than the 
force of the law upon which the complaint was originally 
based, that creates the obligations embodied in the consent 
decree.”  Id. at 522.  “Indeed, it is the parties’ agreement 
that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter 
any judgment at all.”  Id.  That is because consent decrees 
“closely resemble contracts.”  Id. at 519.  Their “most 
fundamental characteristic” is that they are voluntary 
agreements negotiated by the parties for their own 
purposes.  Id. at 521–22; see id. at 522 (“[T]he decree itself 
cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have 
purposes . . . .” (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 
402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971))).  Consequently, when parties 
seek to enforce agreements adopted in consent orders, 
courts construe terms of the settlement based on the intent 
of the parties, not of the court.  See, e.g., United States v. 
ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (“[A] 
consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement 
purposes basically as a contract[.]”); United States v. New 
Jersey, 194 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]s consent 
decrees have many of the attributes of contracts, we 
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interpret them with reference to traditional principles of 
contract interpretation.”); Fox v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319–21 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(examining evidence regarding “the intention of the 
parties”). 
Effexor defendants nevertheless attempt to 
distinguish this case from a mere “rubberstamping of a 
private settlement.”  Wyeth Br. 64.  They point to four 
facts they believe distinguish this case from the typical 
unprotected settlement approval: (1) the full terms of the 
settlement agreement were presented to the District Court; 
(2) the District Court solicited feedback from the FTC; (3) 
the FTC was provided with time and notice of the 
settlement prior to its effectiveness; and (4) the full terms 
of the settlement agreement between Teva and Wyeth 
were included in the consent order.  Id. at 65.   
Those differences fail to convert the otherwise 
passive government approval of a private settlement 
agreement into a protected government action.  As 
discussed earlier, the FTC’s inaction did not represent 
approval of the settlement agreement.  In addition, court 
approval of a settlement agreement, even with access to 
the agreement’s full terms, is simply not akin to a 
corporation’s petition of the government for a monopoly 
or the government’s grant of an exclusive license to a 
corporation.  Cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 
579, 602 (1976) (refusing to allow “state action which 
amounts to little more than approval of a private proposal” 
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to immunize otherwise anticompetitive conduct).  Instead, 
court approval of a settlement agreement of the kind 
alleged here is commercial activity not protected by the 
First Amendment right to petition the government.  See In 
re Androgel Antitrust Litig., No. 1:09-cv-955, 2014 WL 
1600331, at *6–9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2014) (“Indeed, 
providing the consent judgment with Noerr-Pennington 
immunity would largely eviscerate the ruling in Actavis 
and the Court can be sure that subsequent patent 
settlements would always include a consent judgment.”); 
In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 
2d 367, 394–98 (D. Mass. 2013) (“The ways in which 
parties maneuver to transform a settlement agreement into 
a judicially approved consent judgment, then, cannot be 
fairly characterized as direct ‘petitioning’—at least not as 
that word is commonly understood in the context of the 
political process.”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 212–13 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (“Even if signing the Consent Judgment could be 
construed as approving the Settlement Agreements, 
government action that ‘amounts to little more than 
approval of a private proposal’ is not protected.” (quoting 
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 602)).  Finally, we note that accepting 
Effexor defendants’ argument would have the practical 
effect of insulating many (if not most) potentially 
collusive settlement agreements from legal challenge.  If 
Effexor defendants’ actions were sufficient to garner 
Noerr-Pennington immunity, then almost every settlement 
agreement would be submitted to a court for entry of a 
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consent decree, and court approval would be likely to 
result given that no party before the court would be 
challenging the entry of the order.  Effectively, then, no 
third party harmed by a collusive agreement could bring 
an antitrust lawsuit. 
Accordingly, Effexor defendants’ actions in 
submitting their private agreement to the District Court for 
entry of a consent decree are not sufficient to grant that 
agreement Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
V 
In the consolidated Lipitor appeals, the District 
Court not only dismissed Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations 
regarding an unlawful reverse payment but rather 
dismissed the entirety of the complaints in those appeals.  
In doing so, it also rejected allegations relating to Pfizer’s 
fraudulent procurement and enforcement of the ‘995 
Patent.  More specifically, it dismissed as implausible 
allegations that Pfizer fraudulently procured the ‘995 
Patent (Walker Process fraud), wrongfully listed that 
patent in the FDA’s Orange Book, conducted sham 
litigation as the basis for entering into the reverse payment 
settlement agreement, filed a sham “citizen petition,” and 
entered into an overall monopolistic scheme.  We now 
address the dismissal of those additional allegations and 
revive each set of allegations.   
A 
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The District Court dismissed Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
allegations of Pfizer’s fraudulent patent procurement and 
enforcement.  That was error.17 
Fraudulent procurement of a patent or the 
enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud, i.e., Walker 
Process fraud, can provide the basis for antitrust liability.  
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).  To prove Walker 
Process fraud, a plaintiff must, in part, demonstrate  
(1) a false representation or deliberate 
omission of a fact material to patentability, 
(2) made with the intent to deceive the patent 
examiner, (3) on which the examiner 
justifiably relied in granting the patent, and 
(4) but for which misrepresentation or 
deliberate omission the patent would not 
have been granted. 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); see also TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative 
Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
                                                   
17 Because we reverse the dismissal of Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
Walker Process fraud allegations, we will also reverse the 
District Court’s limitation on Lipitor plaintiffs’ potential 
damages period, Lipitor I, 2013 WL 4780496, at *25, as 
that limitation was predicated on the dismissal of the 
Walker Process fraud allegations. 
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(observing that, in addition to proving that the patent was 
obtained through fraud, an antitrust plaintiff must show 
“all the other elements necessary to establish a Sherman 
Act monopolization claim”). 
Lipitor plaintiffs claim that Pfizer obtained the ‘995 
Patent by fraud and then used it to continue to sell Lipitor 
exclusively.  To summarize those allegations, Pfizer 
obtained the ‘995 Patent, claiming protection for 
atorvastatin calcium, as a follow-on patent to the ‘893 
Patent.  To obtain the ‘995 Patent, Pfizer purportedly 
submitted false and misleading data to the PTO showing 
the cholesterol-synthesis inhibiting activity of atorvastatin 
calcium was surprising and unexpected.  More 
specifically, Pfizer submitted a chart with selectively 
misleading data and intentionally failed to submit another 
set of data that undermined its ‘995 Patent application.  
Pfizer provided the PTO with that information despite its 
own scientists informing it that its prior ‘893 Patent 
already covered atorvastatin calcium.  After once denying 
Pfizer’s patent application for atorvastatin calcium as 
“anticipated” by the ‘893 Patent and allegedly receiving 
even more fraudulent data from Pfizer as a result, the PTO 
eventually issued the ‘995 Patent.   
Neither Pfizer nor the District Court challenges the 
sufficiency or specificity of those allegations based on the 
face of the complaint.  The District Court even stated that 
its “decision d[id] not rest on any failure on [Lipitor] 
Plaintiffs’ part under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) or 9(b) to spell 
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out these allegations.”  Lipitor I, 2013 WL 4780496, at 
*18.  Despite disavowing reliance on the pleading 
standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the District Court nonetheless ruled that the Walker 
Process fraud allegations were implausible because they 
“were presented at trial in the litigation before [another 
district court judge], in Australia and Canada, and in 
reissue proceedings before the PTO.”  Id.  More 
specifically, the District Court reasoned that the Walker 
Process fraud allegations were implausible because (1) a 
prior District Court Judge had already determined that 
similar allegations were implausible, (2) the outcomes of 
foreign litigation addressing the fraud allegations failed to 
substantiate those allegations, and (3) the PTO’s 
reissuance of the ‘995 Patent in 2009, despite its 
awareness of the fraud allegations, meant that the PTO 
determined that Pfizer had committed no fraud in its 
original procurement of the patent.  Id. at *19–20.  
Individually or in combination, none of those reasons 
renders the Walker Process fraud allegations implausible.  
We address them each in turn. 
1 
In concluding that Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations of 
Walker Process fraud were implausible, the District Court 
first relied on a District Court’s decision in another case.  
That court had determined that Pfizer had committed no 
wrongdoing in the procurement of the ‘995 Patent.  
Reliance on that prior decision functionally amounted to 
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the application of collateral estoppel and was therefore 
improper because Lipitor plaintiffs were not parties in that 
prior case. 
As described above, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy in 2002 
for infringement of the ‘893 and ‘995 Patents following 
Ranbaxy’s ANDA filing.  Pfizer, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 499.  
In that litigation, Ranbaxy defended against Pfizer’s 
infringement suit by arguing in part that, because Pfizer 
engaged in inequitable conduct in the procurement of the 
‘995 Patent before the PTO, the ‘995 Patent was 
unenforceable.  Id. at 520–21.  Similar to the allegations 
here, Ranbaxy contended that Pfizer withheld information 
from the PTO and misrepresented the results of testing 
related to atorvastatin calcium.  Id.  Following a bench 
trial, however, the District Court in that litigation 
determined that Pfizer committed no inequitable conduct 
in its procurement of the ‘995 Patent.  Id. at 520–25. 
Relying on that determination, the District Court 
here concluded that Lipitor plaintiffs’ Walker Process 
fraud allegations were implausible.  In doing so, it 
effectively bound Lipitor plaintiffs to the other Court’s 
prior determination in the other case.  That is the essence 
of collateral estoppel.18  See Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 
                                                   
18 The District Court also appeared to rely on the law of 
the case doctrine, citing case law applying that doctrine.  
The law of the case doctrine does not apply here because 
it only applies within a single litigation.  See Hamilton v. 
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171 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Collateral estoppel prevents the re-
litigation of a factual or legal issue that was litigated in an 
earlier proceeding.”).   
Applying collateral estoppel against Lipitor 
plaintiffs based on the prior litigation between Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy constitutes reversible error.  Invocation of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine is appropriate only where “the 
party against whom the bar is asserted was a party or in 
privity with a party to the prior adjudication[] and . . . had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.”  
Id. (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of 
Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Here, none 
of the Lipitor plaintiffs was a party in that prior litigation.  
Ruling that their allegations are implausible in light of that 
litigation would thus improperly estop Lipitor plaintiffs 
from raising Walker Process fraud.  See S. Cross Overseas 
Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 
410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[O]n a motion to dismiss, we 
may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion—not 
for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the 
existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable 
dispute over its authenticity.” (emphasis added) (citations 
                                                   
Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The law of 
the case doctrine ‘limits relitigation of an issue once it has 
been decided’ in an earlier stage of the same litigation.” 
(quoting In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 
232 (3d Cir. 2002))). 
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omitted)); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution 
Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f a court 
could take judicial notice of a fact simply because it was 
found to be true in a previous action, the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel would be superfluous.  A plaintiff 
cannot be collaterally estopped by an earlier determination 
in a case in which the plaintiff was neither a party nor in 
privity with a party.” (citations omitted)); United States v. 
Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (“If it were 
permissible for a court to take judicial notice of a fact 
merely because it has been found to be true in some other 
action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be 
superfluous.” (citation omitted)); see also DDAVP, 585 
F.3d at 692 (concluding that the District Court improperly 
relied on the record in an earlier case to dismiss Walker 
Process fraud allegations and noting “the record in this 
case could be different following discovery”).19 
2 
The District Court also cited the presentment of 
similar allegations to Australian and Canadian courts as a 
                                                   
19 Pfizer cites several cases, but none supports the District 
Court’s functional application of collateral estoppel here.  
See, e.g., CBS Outdoor Inc. v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 
No. CIV.A.06-2428HAA, 2007 WL 2509633, at *2, *15 
(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) (concluding that plaintiff’s 
allegations were implausible, as that same plaintiff’s 
allegations had been rejected in state court). 
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basis for dismissal.  It concluded that the results of that 
foreign litigation did “nothing to alter” its conclusion that 
Lipitor plaintiffs’ Walker Process fraud allegations were 
implausible.  Lipitor I, 2013 WL 4780496, at *19–20.  We 
agree only that the past foreign litigation has no bearing 
on the plausibility of the Walker Process fraud allegations 
here.  Even if the District Court were permitted to consider 
it, the rulings in that litigation fail to make Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ allegations implausible. 
As stated above, the factual resolution of issues in 
prior litigation (foreign or otherwise) should not dictate 
the plausibility of Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations when they 
were not parties to that litigation.  See S. Cross Overseas 
Agencies, 181 F.3d at 426 (“[O]n a motion to dismiss, we 
may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion—not 
for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the 
existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable 
dispute over its authenticity.”); Werner v. Werner, 267 
F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Taking judicial notice of 
the truth of the contents of a filing from a related action 
could reach, and perhaps breach, the boundaries of proper 
judicial notice.”). 
Even if consideration of that other foreign litigation 
were appropriate, Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations are still 
plausible.  In the Australian litigation, the Australian trial 
court found that Pfizer was guilty of “false suggestion” 
because the record there raised “[t]he clear inference . . . 
that the claim of surprising and unexpected inhibition of 
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the synthesis of cholesterol . . . is an artificial and 
unsupported claim.”  Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd v Warner-
Lambert Co LLC (No. 2) [2006] FCA 1787 (20 December 
2006) ¶ 357 (Austl.).  On appeal, another Australian court 
concluded that Pfizer’s assertion that its results were 
surprising was “a false representation” and that the patent 
“was obtained by false suggestion or misrepresentation.”  
Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 110 781 826) v. Warner-
Lambert Co LLC [2008] FCAFC 82 (28 May 2008) ¶ 140 
(Austl.).  While the District Court and Pfizer note that the 
Australian courts did not go so far as to say Pfizer 
intentionally committed fraud, those rulings would, if 
anything, seem to support the plausibility of Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ Walker Process allegations here.   
In the Canadian litigation, a Canadian court 
determined that Pfizer’s data and statements in support of 
its Canadian patent (the equivalent of the ‘995 patent) 
were “incorrect” and based on “false suggestion.”  Pfizer 
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2007 F.C. 91, 
paras. 122, 124 (Can. Ont. F.C.).  On appeal, a Canadian 
appeals court reversed, concluding Pfizer’s data and 
statements were not misleading.  Pfizer Canada Inc. v. 
Canada (Minister of Health) (2008), [2009] 1 F.C.R. 253, 
paras. 53–55 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  That decision, though, 
appears to have largely avoided the issue of Pfizer’s 
alleged misrepresentations.  Id. paras. 56–58 (applying 
one section of a Canadian patent statute and noting that 
“[t]he requirement that the specification of a patent be 
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truthful and not be misleading” was in another section of 
the patent statute, which was not at issue).  Were these 
decisions a proper basis to evaluate the plausibility of 
Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations, they would do little to 
suggest implausibility. 
In short, the factual resolution of similar Walker 
Process fraud allegations in foreign litigation not 
involving Lipitor plaintiffs has no bearing on the current 
litigation.  Even assuming consideration of that foreign 
litigation was proper, it fails to suggest the implausibility 
of Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations.   
3 
The District Court finally relied on the reissuance of 
the ‘995 Patent in 2009 to dismiss the Walker Process 
fraud allegations.  It concluded that, because the PTO 
reissued the ‘995 Patent in 2009 despite being made aware 
of the fraud allegations, the reissuance “suggest[ed] that 
[Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegation] that the PTO would not have 
issued the patent but for the alleged misrepresentations or 
omissions [was] implausible.”  Lipitor I, 2013 WL 
4780496, at *20.  We disagree.   
To the extent that the District Court’s decision 
implies that a patent reissuance precludes a finding of 
Walker Process fraud, such reasoning is incorrect.  A 
patent’s reissuance by the PTO does not bar a later finding 
that the patent was originally procured by fraud.  See 
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Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 
1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[I]nequitable 
conduct cannot be cured by reissue . . . .”).  Rather, a fact 
finder may conclude that inequitable conduct or fraud 
occurred in the patent’s prosecution despite the patent’s 
reissuance by the PTO.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1236–37, 1242 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s finding of 
inequitable conduct in patent prosecution despite the 
PTO’s reissuance of patent); see also Hoffman-La Roche 
Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684, 688–89 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“[I]f the district court finds that there was 
inequitable conduct in the prosecution of the original 
patent[,] then the reissue patent is invalid . . . .”).   
Assuming the District Court did not conclude that 
the patent reissuance precluded a finding of fraud but that 
it only “suggested” that such a finding was implausible, 
the District Court failed to draw inferences in Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ favor.  Lipitor plaintiffs allege that, were it not 
for Pfizer’s fraud on the PTO in procuring the ‘995 Patent 
in 1993, the PTO would not have originally issued the ‘995 
Patent.  See Lipitor JA375 (DPP Original Compl. ¶ 242 
(“Were it not for Pfizer’s fraud on the PTO in the context 
of procuring the ‘995 patent, there would never have been 
a ‘995 patent in the first place.”)).  Drawing reasonable 
inferences in their favor, Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegation is 
plausible.  Initially, the PTO issued the ‘995 Patent based 
on data alleged to be fraudulent.  Rather than rely on that 
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data during the reissuance proceedings before the PTO, 
Pfizer based its request for reissuance entirely on Lipitor’s 
“commercial success,” a basis that was clearly not 
available before Lipitor’s launch in 1997.  By Pfizer’s own 
request, the PTO did not base its 2009 decision on the 
allegedly fraudulent data.  During the reissuance 
proceedings, Pfizer told the PTO that the information it 
previously submitted in 1993 was “inaccurate,” that it was 
not “necessary to consider such evidence,” and that Pfizer 
was no longer relying on that data.  Lipitor JA371–72 
(DPP Orig. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 225–28).  Finally, no 
allegations suggest that the PTO’s reissuance made an 
express determination regarding Pfizer’s lack of fraud 
during the original patent proceeding.  These allegations 
plausibly allege that the PTO would not have issued the 
‘995 Patent during the original patent proceedings in 1993 
but for the allegedly fraudulent and misleading 
submissions by Pfizer. 
Pfizer’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.  
First, Pfizer would have us conclude that the PTO 
definitively determined that Pfizer committed no past 
fraud based on the PTO’s Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (“MPEP”), and therefore the reissuance should 
prevent Lipitor plaintiffs from raising Walker Process 
fraud allegations.  As we have already observed, the 
PTO’s reissuance of a patent does not bar a later finding 
that the patent was first procured by fraud.  See 
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288; PIC Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 
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485 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (D. Del. 1980) (“[A] result 
favorable to a patentee in a PTO reissue proceeding on 
issues of invalidity by reason of prior art and fraud is not 
entitled to preclusive effect in the courts.”).   
Moreover, Pfizer’s reliance on the MPEP is 
misplaced.  Pfizer cites language from the MPEP that 
states, “Clearly, if a reissue patent would not be 
enforceable after its issue because of ‘fraud’ . . . during the 
prosecution of the patent sought to be reissued, the reissue 
patent application should not issue.”  MPEP § 2012 (9th 
ed., Nov. 2015).  Pfizer fails to include the next part of that 
same section of the manual, though, which tells the patent 
examiner “not to make any investigation as to lack of 
deceptive intent requirement in reissue applications.  
Applicant’s statement (in the oath or declaration) of lack 
of deceptive intent will be accepted as dispositive except 
in special circumstances such as an admission or judicial 
determination of fraud.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Pfizer also 
points out that Ranbaxy filed protests raising the fraud 
allegations before the PTO during the reissuance 
proceeding.  It argues that the PTO was “required to 
consider such arguments” under the MPEP.  Pfizer Br. 50 
(citing MPEP § 1901.6).  Section 1901.6 of the MPEP, 
however, states that the patent examiner receiving a 
protest raising issues of fraud must enter the protest into 
“the application file, generally without comments on those 
issues.”  MPEP § 1901.6(I)(B).  Given Pfizer’s request 
that the PTO not consider its allegedly fraudulent data, the 
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PTO’s reissuance of the ‘995 Patent on a basis other than 
those fraudulent submissions, the lack of any explicit fraud 
determination by the PTO in its reissuance of the ‘995 
Patent, and the MPEP seemingly limiting patent 
examiners’ investigations into past fraud, we conclude that 
the complaint plausibly alleges that the PTO did not find a 
lack of fraud in initial patent proceedings through its 
reissuance of the ‘995 Patent.   
Second, Pfizer contends that its disclosures of 
information to the PTO during the reissuance proceedings 
undermine the allegations that Pfizer intended to deceive 
the PTO in 1993.  During the reissuance proceedings, 
Pfizer provided information on the Australian and 
Canadian litigations and, as noted earlier, informed the 
PTO that the data previously submitted in support of the 
‘995 Patent was “inaccurate.”  Pfizer’s actions in 2007 
before the PTO during reissuance proceedings, though, 
shed little light on Pfizer’s intent to deceive the PTO back 
in 1993 when Pfizer first sought issuance of the ‘995 
patent.20  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d at 1241 
(“[T]he issue is [the patentee’s] intent during the 
prosecution of the original application.  Thus, [the 
patentee’s] disclosure during reissue is irrelevant to the 
inquiry of whether [the patentee] acquired the . . . patent 
                                                   
20 For a similar reason, Pfizer’s later disclosures of 
information in the foreign litigation fail to make Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent intent implausible.  
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by engaging in inequitable conduct.”).  At the very least, 
Pfizer’s disclosures do not make Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
allegations implausible.   
In sum, the PTO’s reissuance fails to render Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ allegations implausible.  See Therasense, 649 
F.3d at 1288; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d at 1236–
37, 1242. 
B 
After dismissing Lipitor plaintiffs’ Walker Process 
fraud allegations, the District Court also dismissed 
allegations that Pfizer falsely listed the ‘995 Patent in the 
FDA’s Orange Book.  It rejected those allegations of the 
false Orange Book listing based on its dismissal of the 
Walker Process fraud allegations.  Because we conclude 
that Lipitor plaintiffs plausibly allege Walker Process 
fraud, we also reinstate their allegations regarding Pfizer’s 
false Orange Book listing. 
C 
The District Court next dismissed Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
allegations that Pfizer conducted sham litigation.  The 
Court concluded that those allegations were implausible 
largely because the Walker Process fraud allegations were 
implausible.  Again, because we conclude the Walker 
Process fraud allegations are plausible, that is not a ground 
for dismissal.  The District Court also offered several other 
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reasons for dismissing the sham litigation allegations 
related to Pfizer’s suit against Ranbaxy in 2008, but those 
additional grounds fail to persuade. 
Filing a lawsuit essentially petitions the government 
for redress and is therefore generally protected from 
antitrust liability by Noerr-Pennington immunity.  See 
Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 122 
(3d Cir. 1999).  But Noerr-Pennington immunity will not 
shield lawsuits that are a “mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.”  Id. 
(quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).  To demonstrate 
the applicability of that exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s 
lawsuit was both “objectively baseless in the sense that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the 
merits” and “an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor.”  Id. at 122–24 
(quoting Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)). 
In March 2008, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy, claiming that 
Ranbaxy’s generic Lipitor would infringe Pfizer’s two 
Lipitor-related process patents.  Lipitor plaintiffs allege 
that Pfizer’s 2008 lawsuit was a sham.  They assert that 
Pfizer knew Ranbaxy’s generic would not violate those 
patents and that Pfizer simply used the 2008 suit as a way 
to enter into the reverse payment settlement agreement.   
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The District Court first concluded that those 
allegations were implausible because the court in the 
alleged sham litigation “permitted jurisdictional 
discovery” on subject-matter jurisdiction and because 
Lipitor plaintiffs failed to explain why subject-matter 
jurisdiction in that litigation was lacking.  Lipitor I, 2013 
WL 4780496, at *21.  Lipitor plaintiffs, though, alleged 
that Pfizer’s 2008 suit was not justiciable because 
Ranbaxy was already enjoined from selling its generic 
Lipitor for several more years given the earlier litigation 
between the parties.  The grant of jurisdictional discovery 
is also not a determination of the action’s underlying 
merits and certainly has limited, if any, bearing on the 
plausibility of Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations.  Indeed, 
Lipitor plaintiffs explicitly provide allegations as to why 
Pfizer’s 2008 suit lacked merit and was thus a sham.  See 
Lipitor JA255–56 (DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 140–44).   
Second, the District Court observed that the timing 
of Pfizer’s litigation “was consistent with the typical 
duration for litigation infringement claims.”  Lipitor 
JA51–52.  Given the pleading standard, it should not have 
been drawing inferences in Pfizer’s favor regarding the 
timing of Pfizer’s 2008 litigation.  See In re Asbestos Prod. 
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“[W]e must accept as true all plausible facts alleged in her 
amended complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in 
her favor.”).  Lipitor plaintiffs thus plausibly allege that 
Pfizer conducted sham litigation in its 2008 lawsuit 
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against Ranbaxy. 
D 
The District Court next dismissed Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
allegations that Pfizer submitted a sham citizen petition to 
the FDA to prevent Ranbaxy’s entrance into the Lipitor 
market.  It reasoned that Pfizer’s petition was not 
objectively baseless because it was supported by science 
and the FDA believed it had merit.  Dismissal on those 
grounds was improper. 
Beyond immunizing certain petitioning in the 
judicial system, Noerr-Pennington immunity also protects 
petitioning of “all types of government entities.”  
Cheminor Drugs, 168 F.3d at 122.  Petitions to 
administrative agencies are consequently also immune 
from antitrust liability.  See id.  But as with the immunity 
extended for filing a lawsuit, Noerr-Pennington protection 
will not apply to petitions that are a “mere sham to cover 
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”  
Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).  Petitioning that is 
“objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits” 
and “an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor” will not be immune from 
antitrust liability.  Id. at 122–24 (quoting Prof’l Real 
Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60). 
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Analyzing this exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, the District Court first concluded that the 
citizen petition to the FDA could not have been 
“objectively baseless” because it was supported by 
science.  That conclusion is incorrect given the pleading 
standard here.  Lipitor plaintiffs contend that Pfizer filed a 
sham citizen petition raising baseless concerns about 
Ranbaxy’s use of amorphous atorvastatin calcium in its 
generic version of Lipitor.  Lipitor plaintiffs allege Pfizer’s 
petition was a sham because (1) it “ignored more than a 
decade of FDA policy, the FDA’s 2002 rejection of a 
similar argument in relation to the drug Ceftin, subsequent 
FDA pronouncements reinforcing that the polymorphic 
form of the drug (i.e., crystalline versus amorphous) 
[were] immaterial to ANDA approval,” Lipitor JA242 
(DPP Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 95), (2) it ignored Pfizer’s own 
use of the amorphous form of atorvastatin in its clinical 
studies “to support the safety and efficacy of Lipitor,” id., 
(3) it lacked any evidence that amorphous atorvastatin 
calcium “would not be pharmaceutically equivalent or 
bioequivalent to branded Lipitor,” Lipitor JA241 (DPP 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 96), and (4) the FDA ultimately denied 
Pfizer’s citizen petition.  Those allegations plausibly 
allege Pfizer submitted a sham petition not supported by 
science.  To conclude otherwise requires an evaluation of 
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the scientific merit of Pfizer’s petition.  Such an inquiry is 
unsuitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.21 
The District Court also determined the citizen 
petition was not “objectively baseless” because the FDA 
considered the petition on its merits.  To reach that factual 
conclusion, it observed that the FDA took several years to 
reach a decision on the petition and that the FDA described 
the petition as “complex.”  Neither of those observations, 
however, leads to the conclusion that Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
sham citizen petition allegations are implausible.  All 
citizen petitions are granted or denied by the FDA.  See 21 
C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(1) (“The Commissioner shall . . . rule 
upon each petition . . . .”).  Mere consideration of a 
petition by an agency, even lengthy consideration, does 
not immunize that petition.  See Hanover 3201 Realty, 
                                                   
21 Pfizer also argues that its mere submission of data to the 
FDA in support of its petition renders implausible 
allegations that the petition was a sham.  Reading the 
complaints in the light most favorable to Lipitor plaintiffs, 
a reasonable inference is that the data submitted with the 
petition only perpetuated Pfizer’s baseless attempt to 
prevent Ranbaxy’s entry into Lipitor’s market.  At the very 
least, the mere submission of data in support of a petition 
raises no inference that the petition itself possessed merit.  
Put simply, Pfizer’s submission of data with its petition 
does not make Lipitor plaintiffs’ sham petition allegations 
implausible.   
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LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 180–83 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (applying the sham exception to Noerr-
Pennington to defendants’ permit objections and 
observing “[t]hat the [government agency] was required to 
consider Defendants’ challenge does not mean that their 
arguments had any bite”).  Equating delay in consideration 
of a petition or its complexity with the petition’s 
underlying merits also fails to draw inferences in Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ favor.  Reasonable inferences from those facts 
are that the FDA’s delay in deciding the petition had no 
connection to the petition’s merits and that the petition’s 
“complexity” also reflected little about its actual merits.  
Moreover, according to Lipitor plaintiffs, the FDA 
delayed in reaching a decision on the citizen petition, in 
part, because it knew of the settlement agreement between 
Ranbaxy and Pfizer.  Lipitor JA269 (DPP Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 193 (“[O]nce [the] FDA learned of the fact that 
the first generic for Lipitor, i.e., Ranbaxy’s, would not be 
marketed until November 30, 2011, [the] FDA shifted 
assets away from Ranbaxy’s ANDA and the Pfizer 
petition . . . .”)). 
The District Court’s dismissal of Lipitor plaintiffs’ 
sham citizen petition allegations was error. 
E 
The District Court finally dismissed Lipitor 
plaintiffs’ allegations that Pfizer participated in an overall 
monopolistic scheme.  It dismissed those allegations based 
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on its dismissal of all the above allegations (i.e., the 
allegations concerning Walker Process fraud, the false 
Orange Book listing, sham litigation, and the sham citizen 
petition).  Because we conclude that those allegations are 
plausible, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal 
of Lipitor plaintiffs’ allegations that Pfizer participated in 
an overall scheme of monopolistic conduct was also error. 
VI 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the District 
Court’s dismissals in both the Lipitor and Effexor 
consolidated appeals.  We will remand those consolidated 
cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
